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ABSTRACT

Miller, Rachel L. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2012.
“Political Party Transitions in Post-Conflict States: How Political Parties Reacted and Adapted During
Democratic Transitions in Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique.”

This study argues that political parties in the post-conflict period are adaptable to and capable of
changing roles as states transition to peacetime settings. In the aftermath of war in El Salvador,
Cambodia and Mozambique and during a democratic transition, changes in political party structures and
attitudes, and the influence of external actors emerged as significant factors in the way political parties
adapted. National and international political contexts, ideological differences and war time political
party origins played a part in incumbent and insurgent political parties’ behaviors and electoral
successes in the aftermath of war, which has ultimately affected the democratic transition, in some
cases undermining. This study demonstrates the nuance of democratic transition, how each individual
case is unique and the importance of internal actors during the transition period and after.
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Chapter I: Introduction
The end of civil conflict ushers in a period that is often unstable and always uncertain. During
the time following the conflict, the function of previously warring parties and their changing role in a
peacetime government is crucial to developing the new political landscape. The parties must
restructure themselves, adapt to a new political landscape, and promote themselves to earn mass
appeal without the aid of arms. The difficulty in the task of establishing a functioning and legitimate
peacetime party is evident in the lack of success most parties emerging from conflict have in
accomplishing this undertaking. Political parties in the countries of El Salvador, Mozambique, and
Cambodia are familiar with this process. All three of these countries have emerged from long periods of
civil conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the warring parties in each have had to adapt to the
peacetime political landscape. The National Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the Farabundo Martí
National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) and the
Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) in Mozambique, and the Cambodian Peoples’ Party (CPP) and
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)
of Cambodia are all parties that have emerged from their respective civil conflicts; and, perhaps
surprisingly, have remained important members of the political landscape afterwards.
This thesis is a case study of the above mentioned political parties in El Salvador, Mozambique, and
Cambodia during the timeframe of their transitions from countries dealing with civil conflicts through
the resolution. This study’s timeframe also includes the aftermath of the respective conflicts. The
purpose of the study is to determine which factors are most important in enabling parties functioning in
conflict settings to function and transition in peacetime settings in a post-conflict period. It seeks to do
this by studying countries that are very different regionally and culturally. However, aside from these
differences, it can be argued that these cases best fit into a “most similar systems” design. The
similarities in political backgrounds of these countries including factors such as international political
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climate, internal political climate, internal political actors, and intervention tactics, are factors that
influenced political party transitions. Similarities among the countries include: the transition from a
period of civil conflict to a period of peace and democratic transition, the timeframe of the transition,
the existence of opposition/insurgent parties and status quo/incumbent parties, and similar ideological
backgrounds among some of the parties.
Questions, doubts, and differences of opinion often surface regarding particular cases when
characterizing what does and does not constitute a success story in conflict to peacetime transitions in
the political arena. While it is unlikely that all scholars would agree on the degree of success in each of
these situations, there is notable agreement among scholars on categorizing these countries as success
stories in their respective transitions (to relative peace, if not democracy) (Montgomery 1995;
Wantchekon 1999, 2004). Although some speak of these cases as success stories, only El Salvador
scored high enough on the Freedom House ranking to be considered “free” (Freedom House 2009).
Mozambique was characterized as “partly free” and Cambodia as “not free” according to this particular
scoring system. It is important to note in the case of Freedom House, however, governments are not
rated as such, but instead Freedom House assesses the freedoms and real-world rights of citizens of
each country. Essentially, Freedom House considers rights in practice to be of greater importance in
their rating system versus the presence of legal rights. This is an important distinction to make in these
cases because the transitions are happening in a way in which the government itself is changing, but not
always in a manner which translates to increased access to civil rights for citizens. Additionally, Freedom
House takes into account how freedoms are affected by “government officials, as well as non state
actors, including insurgents and other armed groups” (Freedom House 2009). While Freedom House
states that it does not survey the governments and the actors within these governments (political
parties and other institutions) for the purpose of its survey, the organization still provides important
insight as to the overall ability of citizens of a particular country to enjoy political and civil rights.
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Though perhaps not ranking as “free” according to Freedom House, as of 2011 the U.S. State
Department considered each country in this study a multiparty democracy (US State Department 2011).
Classifying these countries as democracies coupled with the Freedom House rankings raises a set of subquestions: What exactly is democracy and are these parties and countries truly functioning in a
“democratic” fashion? Does the appeal of democracy influence the way the parties behave? How much
has pressure from the outside, especially the UN, the United States and other donors, influenced the
path of the peacetime parties and their redefined functions within these countries?
In addition to these sub-questions, one must examine the individual parties in the present
governments and ask how have they developed and what exactly is important for party development in
general. One must also examine pitfalls to which political parties often become subject, such as internal
fragmentation or personalism (Ansell and Fish 1999). Additionally, one must examine how parties work
together in terms of accomplishing a common goal, or solving a specific problem. In these cases, the
resolution of civil conflicts is instrumental to this study. Other important factors are the common
strategies among the parties. For example, Carrie Manning points to collective incentive strategies in
the case of Mozambique’s political parties as a means for appealing to their bases; she discusses how
the incentives may change over time as the political context within the country changes (Manning
2004). All of the sub-questions and additional topics mentioned above are essential to fully exploring
the central thesis question.
Political Party Definitions
Parties born out of conflict are different from traditional political parties created in a
peacetime context. Traditionally, functional peacetime political parties are defined as institutions that
“a) establish the link between state and society; b) determine to a greater or lesser degree the
formation of governments; and c) guarantee some degree of universalism in the representation of social
interests concerning the exercise of state power” (Cansino 1995, 170). Political parties, no matter how
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they are created, are forced to adjust the way they function in order to survive depending on the given
situation of the country. In times of war, parties use military tactics, and in these cases, as more
peaceful societies emerged, the parties had to adapt to function in the peacetime context. According to
Manning, “parties, as both survival-oriented and goal-oriented organizations, are adaptive organizations
and will adjust over time to their electoral environment” (Manning 200, 255). Manning’s observation is
especially appropriate for this study: how are parties born out of a revolutionary or civil war type
conflict different from political parties formed in a peaceful setting ? Additionally, does a formerly
militant party background hinder the parties’ ability to successfully adjust to a peacetime transition?
How can wartime parties demilitarize so as to lead a newly peaceful nation? Are there particular ways
in which wartime parties demilitarize that are more associated with successful democratic transitions?
Scholars such as Jeroen de Zeeuw point to certain changes in structure and agency as being crucial to a
successful “rebel-to-party transformation” (de Zeeuw 2008, 12). These important adjustments on the
part of the political parties are discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.
For the purpose of this paper it is important to define political parties in two different ways. The
conventional definition states that political parties, “a) establish the link between state and society; b)
determine to a greater or lesser degree the formation of governments; and c) guarantee some degree of
universalism in the representation of social interests concerning the exercise of state power” (Cansino
1995, 170). This definition is used to refer to legitimate peacetime political parties (Cansino 1995).
Additionally, the term conflict party must be defined in order to address the parties competing during
the respective conflicts. Conflict party will refer to a party that is created during a civil war type conflict,
a party that is created in opposition to a party created in a civil war type conflict, or to a party that is
formed in a peacetime context, yet has evolved from a traditionally defined political party to a party
preoccupied with dominating its opposition through means of violence in a conflict setting (Manning
2007, 253). According to several scholars on the topic, including Caroline Hughes, Steven J. Hood, and
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de Zeeuw, one of the main differences between legitimate peacetime political parties and conflict
parties is that the roots (or the parties’ origins) of conflict parties are militarized and difficult to change
(Hughes 2002; Hood 2004; de Zeeuw 2008). Ideologically, there are similarities and differences between
and among both conflict parties and legitimate peacetime political parties that need to be analyzed in
more detail.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
In the literature on political party transition that focuses on the transition of conflict parties to
legitimate peacetime political parties three main themes emerge as relevant: a desire to democratize, a
change in party structure and attitude, and external influence, particularly from the United Nations and
the United States. This chapter’s focus is on how transitioning parties need to legitimize themselves in
the eyes of citizens and remain successful and relevant in the new political landscape. Later chapters
help to determine whether or not the above named factors provide the basis for a more stable party
transition and party longevity in the new political landscape.
The Desire to Democratize
In his investigation of countries emerging from civil war and beginning democratic transitions,
Leonard Wantchekon states that most political theorists point to the post-conflict period as an
opportune time for dictatorship to take hold (Wantchekon 2004). Wantchekon disagrees and goes on
to explain his theory on post-civil war democratization. He argues that the need for political order and
the possibility of alternation in power inherent in democracy makes it an alluring option for post civil
conflict countries (Wantchekon 2004). Elections provide a welcome compromise for countries with
parties caught in power struggles rife with violent conflict. With democracy on the table, technically
neither side has to permanently concede, because with democratic rule, the possibility of regaining
power is always present in elections. Wantchekon’s post-civil war democratization theory corresponds
with the minimalist argument presented by Adam Przeworski “that the very prospect that governments
may change can result in a peaceful regulation of conflicts” (Przeworski 1999, 13).
One could also argue, however, that democracy is not the key to stability, that it is at times
associated with violence and instability. As Steven J. Hood explains in his work detailing political
development and democratic theory, timing is important, and leaping from an authoritarian regime to a
democratic form of government is not always ideal. Hood states:
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It is not uncommon for the failed policies of infant democratic regimes to lead to a rejection of
democracy by the critics of democracy. Many infant democracies have reverted to
authoritarianism after the new democratic government proved no more or less able to improve
conditions than did its predecessor (Hood 2004, 58).
While Hood concedes that democracy may not be the best governmental solution in a postauthoritarian period, he does note that the most important aspect in the transition is an attempted
reform and even a “limited degree of liberalization” (Hood 2004, 59). Hood characterizes the transition
period as a trial and error period. He essentially poses the idea that eventually small amounts of
liberalization and perhaps reversion occur, but such setbacks are temporary and over time the
liberalized parts of the system may become institutionalized (Hood 2004).
Carrie Manning’s assessment of democracy as a sustainable stalemate supports Wantchekon’s
post-civil war democratization theory. Manning addresses the allure of democracy as a way for parties
to avoid losing the conflict at hand because democracy presents an acceptable chance for alternation of
power. She also details the general shift from armed opposition group to political party, citing a number
of important factors such as international involvement, institutional changes, and the nature of the
conflict itself as significant aspects in a shift (Manning 2004). These factors will be discussed in more
detail later in the chapter. Building on Manning’s characterization of democracy as a suitable chance for
variation in power, William I. Zartman makes the case for democracy serving as a sustainable stalemate.
Zartman states, “In internal conflict, stalemate is stable and supportable, an acceptable alternative to
losing for both sides” (Zartman 1993, 26). It could be argued that the allure of democracy in a postconflict situation is the willingness for political actors to live with this stalemate. A stalemate allows
them to end the violence without actually conceding, and because the country is transitioning to a
democracy the possibility for a change in power is an option.
While democracy may seem like an alluring option to previously warring sides vying for power,
Caroline Hughes and Carlos M. Vilas contend that the adoption of new political systems, in this case
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democracy, sometimes by outside institutions, takes more than just changing institutions and structures
of government. Vilas states:
Political institutions—such as parliaments, elections, ombudsmen, or any other—can be
‘exported’ and subsequently ‘imported’, but this does not imply that they will operate in the
new setting as they do in the original one: people adapt institutions to their own necessities,
abilities and expectations (Vilas 1996, 498).
Essentially, Vilas’ statement means that although political changes may occur, the culture of the
transitioning countries may face difficulties in implementing a new system due to years of engrained
governmental and societal culture. National culture and political culture in the countries of conflict may
not have caught up to the changes in system brought about the conclusions of the conflicts. Stephen
Chilton’s study on defining political culture notes that it is a seemingly simple concept wrought with
complexities. He outlines nine different criteria important in defining political culture and acknowledges
that in its inception, defining political culture was “the classic problem of specifying how people affect
their political system, and vice versa” (Chilton 1988, 419). National culture, as defined by Gregory
Jusdanis, is often synonymous with national identity and comprises, “the communal memories, symbols,
and feelings that are believed to differentiate one nation from another” (Jusdanis 1995, 24).
According to Larry Diamond, democracy cannot exist without the people’s belief in its
legitimacy, meaning that the citizenry of the transitioning countries need to see the benefits of
democracy in their own lives. It is therefore important for democratic principles not to be infused just
into institutions and procedures, but also into the national and political culture of the transitioning
countries (Diamond 1999). One of the main obstacles to establishing the legitimacy of democracy in the
national culture, especially in these cases, is poverty. Cultural roadblocks along with continued
economic inequalities, even in the post-conflict period can make legitimization of democracy extremely
difficult. In addition to Vilas’ comments on how national and political culture can affect importation of
systems, he comments on the consequences of economic inequalities as well, stating:
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Extreme poverty jeopardizes the very concept of citizenship, inasmuch as such poverty excludes
people from access to services and basic resources—jobs, health and education—which are
considered to be basic preconditions for personal autonomy and meaningful political
participation (Vilas 1996, 468).
Vilas’ important commentary, on both culture and economy, highlights the numerous obstacles in a
democratic transition.
Poverty can be easily recognized as an important factor in impeding the adoption of democracy
into the national and political culture in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique where the Human
Development Index rankings were 105, 139, and 184 out of 187, respectively, for 2011 (UNDP 2011).
The desire for democracy could certainly be seen as tied to expectations of economic development, as
most consolidated democracies are economically developed. Given the extreme economic inequalities
in many countries transitioning to democracies, it is conceivable that citizens could have expectations of
poverty alleviation as well.
If defining democracy itself is complex, evaluating whether or not a democracy is consolidated
poses some additional complications in the defining process. Diamond says, “the essence of democratic
consolidation is a behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods by both
elites and mass” (Diamond 1999, 20). While this definition or description of the “essence” of
democratic consolidation may not be all encompassing, it serves as a good basis to define democratic
consolidation for this review. To elaborate on this basic definition, Diamond cites a number of scholars
who concur that for a democracy to be considered consolidated is must be viewed as “the only game in
town,” (Diamond 1999, 65). It is important for democracy as a system of government to be so
internalized on a mass level that citizens of a given country would not consider any other option.
Diamond points out a “democratic consolidation can thus only be fully understood as encompassing a
shift in political culture” (Diamond 199, 65).
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Changes in Party Structure and Attitude
Changes in party structure and attitude are additional themes found in party transition
literature. The ways in which the individual parties’ attitude and structure must change is also
dependent on their respective roles as either an incumbent party or a revolutionary movement during
the conflict. According to Jeroen de Zeeuw, structural and attitudinal changes of formerly militant
parties are of the utmost importance in a post-conflict party transition period. He states that
demilitarization and the development of the party organization are the two main structural changes. De
Zeeuw notes that democratization of decision-making and adaptation of strategies and goals serve as
the two main attitudinal changes (de Zeeuw 2008).
De Zeeuw mentions several important changes that must take place for structural change to
occur. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, or DDR, are some of the most significant and
difficult changes that need to occur (de Zeeuw 2008). Some scholars, such as Alpaslan Özerdem
recognize an additional “R,” reinsertion, altering the acronym to read DDRR. Özerdem provides
important definitions for the DDRR acronym. He notes that disarmament refers to the physical
collection and disposal of weapons, while demobilization is the process by which the armed parties
downsize or disband. Additionally, he notes that reinsertion is when the demobilized establish
themselves in a civilian environment, which allows them to reintegrate (Özerdem 2004). Tommie Sue
Montgomery notes that a lack of demobilization stalls militant parties from re-entering society
(Montgomery 1995). Disarming and demobilizing combatants within the warring parties can take many
months. Additionally, the reintegration of former combatants into society is often given little attention
by those who assume power. Requiring active militants to disarm is difficult, but integrating
transitioning militants back into society and helping them find a means for supporting themselves, is
often overlooked.
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The use of violence as the principle means of political strategy is frequently difficult to change
in post war settings. When the parties are forced to disarm and demobilize, through ceasefires or new
rules to help a society transition to peace, they give up the comfort and control of being able to defend
themselves and their causes militarily. Particularly, in the conflicts discussed in this study, warfare was
waged for years, and to many, it was a way of life. The reality of DDR strips the warring factions of the
defenses they have employed for years, sometimes decades. This structural change is especially
important in curbing future violence. Even after peace agreements are signed, in some cases, violence
and intimidation have been used as a means for electoral disruption and exclusion of other political
parties (Hughes 2004).
Restructuring and adjustments within the party organizations are other important structural
changes. As de Zeeuw outlines, “parties that are capable of representing popular interests, fielding
electoral candidates, organizing electoral campaigns, and taking on governance responsibilities must be
developed” (de Zeeuw 2008). Additionally, opposition parties must secure a voter base and organize
the leadership of the party for functional participation in the peacetime context. Adding to the
discussion of party organization, Manning addresses the need for securing voters and dealing with intraelite relations as the two most daunting obstacles in the transition (Manning 2007). Intra-elite relations
can be defined as the relationship between leaders within the dominant blocs. Manning’s work notes
that intra-elite challenges in dealing with changes in attitude and structure “can be usefully thought of in
terms of the costs and benefits....of investing fully in electoral politics” (Manning 2004, 60). These
obstacles are part structural and part attitudinal.
The way intra-elite relations change and function during the transition period is an important
part of the change in party structure and attitude. Manning outlines a number of challenges faced by
the dominant coalition groups in a transition period. Factors such as pressure from external actors to
change or reform party leadership, adjusting skills to market the party in a peace time settings,
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acclimating to necessary organizational changes within the party, and pinpointing, enlisting and
retaining suitable candidates to run for office are all established as important components (Manning
2004). These structural changes must be addressed throughout the transition period for the parties to
adjust to a new setting and electoral process.
Securing a voter base becomes difficult as war-time funding is diminished both internally and
externally (Manning 2007). During the conflict, parties may receive funding from supporters, or those
with vested interests in the conflict’s outcome. Once the conflict comes to an end, certain investors no
longer have the incentive to contribute funds. As Manning notes, leaders often “must seek out new
patrons or funding sources” (Manning 2007, 254). Additionally, post-conflict settings are often
tumultuous for the country, turning off potential new backers who do not want to pump money into a
shaky investment. Once money starts to dry up, parties face new challenges in getting their message
out to potential voters. It is common for parties to either shift towards a more centrist position or a
more extreme position on the political spectrum in order to draw in new party participants. Parties
must decide if they are going to draw more voters by shoring up radical, polarized positions or by
adopting centrist, politics (Manning 2007). Each move has the potential for lost votes, but parties must
individually assess what factors they must change in order to appeal to the people in the new peacetime
setting.
The structural changes serve as a predecessor to de Zeeuw’s attitudinal changes:
democratization of decision-making and adaptation of strategies and goals (de Zeeuw, 2008).
Democratization, as discussed in the previous section, is an attitudinal change that is difficult to
accomplish and measure. Adapting new strategies and goals is outlined by Manning in her discussion
about collective incentive strategies, which she defines as “changes in the way parties seek to attract a
mass following” (Manning 2004, 55). As noted above, parties may change their positions in an attempt
to attract a mass following. Ultimately, Manning states that parties must have a persuasive motive to
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change their collective incentive strategies (Manning 2004). Motives to alter collective incentive
strategies vary, but can be influenced by external actors, the nature of the conflict itself, the number of
people willing to continue to support the party ideas popular during the conflict period, and the
willingness of the party to fully adapt to a changing political environment. These motives often surface
in the new political climates that accompany the party transitions; however, Manning points out that
politics in some countries remain so polarized that parties do not always have to change their collective
incentive strategies to appeal to their bases. Although attitudinal changes may be a focal point for a
party that truly is engaged in a transition process, political systems with sustained, extreme polarity
continue to boost parties that represent their bases as they did during the conflict.
Influence of External Actors
Scholars present valid arguments, theories, and ideas for explaining the allure of democracy for
internal actors in each of these countries. The political parties addressed in this study also came under
the influence of external actors and international political climate at the time of their transitions. The
wars in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Cambodia were, to varying degrees, proxies for the Cold War and
their end coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union. This post Cold War climate is associated with the
“third wave” of democracy (Huntington 1991, 12). External support and incentives such as aid helped
the “third wave” to act as a catalyst for the parties in El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia to
transition to democratic forms of government in their respective post conflict periods.
External actors played and play a significant part in influencing parties that participated in the
conflict. In the post- war period, influence has come largely in the form of monetary assistance, but
external actors have served as peacemakers in conflicts, most notably on the part of the UN acting as
the liaison for peace talks. Aid for the purpose of rebuilding the countries, boosting their economies,
supporting a democratic transition, and persuading parties to cooperate are examples of such attempts
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at influence. However, analysts disagree over how much influence external actors have in addressing
the underlying causes of the conflict so as to prevent its reoccurrence.
As mentioned earlier, external actors were involved in all three cases both during and after the
period of conflict. During the conflict resolution, external actors such as the U.S., provided economic or
military aid based on vested interests in influencing conflict outcomes. In the post-conflict period,
external actors have proposed strategies for conflict, overseen the implementation of peace processes,
and continued their influence with economic aid and investment. In El Salvador, Mozambique and
Cambodia, the UN played a pivotal role and as Tommie Sue Montgomery points out, “first, a willingness
on the part of both warring factions to use the United Nations as a mediator, both before and after the
peace accords [are] signed,” is crucial to beginning the resolution process (Montgomery 1995, 161).
Though regional and Western influences are important in these cases, the significance of the UN as a
peacemaking body cannot be overstated. The UN’s role in being able to bring both (or all) sides of the
conflict to the table is one that potentially could not have been achieved solely through the efforts of an
external actor such as the U.S. (given that these external actors often had taken sides in these wars).
Beginning in the early 1990s, the UN began to increase the size and scope of its peace operations in
countries like Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. Though concerned about expanding
responsibilities that ranged from election observation to maintaining truces, the ability to pool
resources from member states in order to intervene gave the UN a unique ability to become a conduit
for conflict resolution following the Cold War (Lebovic 2004).
Internal actors transitioned from “‘bullets to ballots’” through assistance from external actors as
part of international democracy promotion (Hughes 2001, 295). El Salvador, Mozambique and
Cambodia received significant outside assistance in their peace processes, especially from the UN.
Although each mission is different regarding specifics, in all three cases, the UN assisted with securing
and prolonging the negotiated ceasefires and cessation of hostilities. After years of tormenting war,

14

international involvement cannot only help put an end to the violence, which is the first priority in
establishing what Felix Kulipossa calls a “turnaround,” but it also helps to shape incentive structures for
the peace process (Kulipossa 2006, 40). Ending the violence and determining incentive structures for
peace going forward are essential components as a country transitions to democracy.
As countries transition, there are many new challenges to navigate. Simply the idea that a
country’s citizens must themselves ultimately decide on the country’s system of government and
political structure is something new in these countries. As discussed in an earlier section, political
culture is significant in this determination. In Caroline Hughes’ work, “habituation,” is when
international democracy promoters influence the internal actions and agreements of the elite.
Promoters replace some strategies of the political elite (strategies of the past that do not adhere to
democratic principles) with external democracy promotion strategies in order to further promotion of a
new form of government. The habituation approach is noted as being deficient in addressing underlying
concerns of the conflict. Hughes explains that the concentration on habituation by outside promoters
puts too much focus on infusing democracy into institutions and procedures. The focus on institutions
and procedures often leads to neglect in promoting democratic ideas within the population and
drumming up popular support, which is crucial to the development and longevity of democracy (Hughes
2001).
Therefore, external actors can provide assistance by organizing peace talks and providing and
monetary as well as non-monetary support to newly transitioned governments and political parties, but
their ability to impose new institutions in the new political landscape is questionable. The political
climate during the transition period is tumultuous and uncertain. External actors can only orchestrate
events to a certain extent. Political systems can be influenced, foreign aid increased, a tentative stability
achieved, but after all of this is accomplished, it is truly up to the internal political actors, including the
citizenry of the country, to commit to, create, and abide by the new rules.
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Scholarly work on political party transitions details the roles and behaviors of political parties in
post-conflict situations. The nuances they provide in regard to how a democratic political system is
adopted or how external actors can affect a transitioning country, fit together to create a panorama of
party transition. The work on political party transitions demonstrates the complexity of defining and
researching political changes in post-conflict transitions. No transition is the same, so defining and
theorizing about what makes some parties successful or unsuccessful after a transition is a challenge.
Comparing systems with pronounced similarities can help to streamline the research and generate
broad conclusions as to how parties make the transition from wartime to peacetime successful and how
others might do so in the future.
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Chapter III: The Democratic Transition
El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia all experienced transitions in the form of government
following their respective conflicts. Democratic transitions emerged as one of the main themes in the
post-conflict literature focusing on these countries. Democratic transitions and the way parties alter
their behavior as the transition develops go hand in hand. This is part of democratic institutionalization.
As a new form of government emerges, parties will often adjust to function within the developing
direction of rule. Adjustments may include things such as leadership changes, changes in message,
demilitarization and adherence to new rules adopted as democracy takes hold (Manning 2004). The
way in which parties adjust to democratization is particularly important because the move to
democratization is a common thread in each of these cases. The transition to democracy also influences
change in institutions, procedures, political culture, as well as the role of external actors (Diamond
1999).
A background on the conflicts and involved parties in each country is essential to understanding how
the parties changed their behavior as the democratic transitions unfolded. Additionally, understanding
the role external actors played in ending the conflicts in these cases is an essential component of
assessing their transitions. According to Robert B. Lloyd, “a political settlement must satisfy the
combatants’ expectations regarding the resolution of the causes of the conflict” (Lloyd 2001, 303). The
settlement of the conflict must address not only immediate causes, but also underlying causes of the
conflict. Addressing the underlying causes of the conflict is often where external actors fall short (Lloyd
2001).
It is important to consider the interests of external actors as well in studying democracy promotion.
Democracy promotion was not a new concept when these cases were transitioning; however, the end of
the Cold War had changed the role of external actors in these countries. The end of the Cold War
motivated the external actors to pull out of the wars and contribute to the peace process. The UN
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played an instrumental part of ending these wars and facilitating peace negotiations in each of these
cases. According to Eva Bertram, UN missions often had four common traits: 1) the UN dealt with
conflicts within instead of between states, 2) like the U.S., the UN intervened in conflicts where the host
government was one of the parties in the conflict, 3) the UN aimed to implement a political transition
following an end of military violence, and 4) the UN sought to change or establish basic state institutions
(Bertram 1995). Through the UN (and in addition to it) the U.S. has also been a major player in
intervening in conflicts with Cold War roots. Regional actors (such as Mexico, South Africa, and China)
have played a role as well.
Overview of the Conflicts, Peace Processes, and Political Liberalization
El Salvador
El Salvador is steeped in a long history of inequitable resource distribution dating as least as far back
as Spanish colonial rule. This inequality has influenced the formation and ideologies of modern political
parties and the current governmental system in the country (Wantchekon 1999). El Salvador’s National
Republican Alliance (ARENA), which had an alliance with the Salvadoran government in the 1980s, and
the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) were at war for over a decade from 1980 to 1992
in a conflict that caused the death and disappearance of an estimated 70,000 civilians (Holiday 2010).
The war in El Salvador was the result of a long history of inequitable distribution of resources (especially
land) and concentration of power in the hands of a small group of elites interested in maintaining the
status quo. In a 1988 survey, poverty and disparity in land distribution were named as key reasons for
the conflict in El Salvador (Wantchekon 1999). The country has a long and violent history of aggressive
acts perpetuated against the poor and indigenous populations of the country (DiNovella 2004). Some
significant examples include the government killing of 30,000 people over a month long period in 1932
after a rebellion against the military junta in control at that time known as La Matanza. 1 During the

1

“The Slaughter” or “The Massacre”
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decades of conflict many who ministered to and stood with the poor were murdered, including priests
such as Rutilio Grande and Oscar Romero, American lay woman Jean Donovan, Sister Dorothy Kazel,
Sister Maura Clarke and Sister Ita Ford (DiNovella 2004; Carrigan 2005).
The war began in 1980 when the FMLN was formed as a coalition of leftist groups and began an
insurgency against the Salvadoran government. FMLN member Joaquin Villalobos says that the
coalition developed due to the concrete reality of the needs of the majority of the Salvadoran people,
one of the most important needs being land. He characterizes the party as one that suffered the
ideological pitfalls often characterizing revolutionary parties, stating, “Revolutionary movements face
the challenge of maintaining an objective analysis of reality in their countries, rather than falling back on
ideologically motivated ‘wishful dreams’” (Villalobos 1989, 104). While revolutions can influence
change, there are practices and ideas so ingrained into the government and the culture of a given
country that revolutionary success cannot always ensure complete change.
One major player that was aligned with, but eventually withdrew support from ARENA in part, was
the Salvadoran Catholic Church. The branch of the church that prescribed to liberation theology was not
supportive of ARENA’s causes. This school of thought advocated for the liberation of people who faced
unjust economic, political or social circumstances. Liberation theology developed in Latin America
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but was often controversial and criticized by the Vatican and the
Church establishment in many Latin American countries. In supporting the masses during the conflict,
the Catholic Church, seen as a power player and elite ally in years prior to the conflict, disrupted the
power structure by throwing its weight behind the poor, a move influenced by the liberation theology
movement in Latin America. This movement caused a disruption in the power structure as it aligned
itself with the very people the government was trying to prevent from disrupting the status quo
(Skidmore and Smith 2001).
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As the conflict developed ARENA was created as a counter-insurgency party and fought to maintain
El Salvador’s status quo. The right wing ARENA party used its government strength and resources to
wage a counter-insurgency against the guerilla fighters of the FMLN. A party of military men and
landowners with connections to death squads in the country, ARENA was founded in 1980 by army
Major Roberto D’Aubuisson. ARENA and the Salvadoran government mirrored many other Latin
American countries that since the end of colonial rule had failed to share resources among the larger
population. At the time the war began, El Salvador boasted a large rural population with one of the
highest rates of land concentration and landless population in Latin America (Seligson 1995). Aligned
with ARENA and the Salvadoran government was an oligarchy known as “the 14 families” (the small
group of elites that held the majority of the country’s wealth), the military, and the international sector
(Skidmore and Smith 2001).
Throughout the conflict, the U.S. had provided funding to the Salvadoran government. In 1983, “the
United States was supplying $205 million in economic aid and $26 million in military assistance, with
higher requests pending Congress” (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 346). The central reason for funding the
Salvadoran government and military throughout the course of the conflict was tied to the Reagan
administration’s concern that the FMLN was aided by Cuba and the USSR, and the administration’s Cold
War desire to curb the spread of communism in Latin America. Although government forces were larger
and better equipped, they were unable to put down the insurgency largely due to popular support
(Skidmore and Smith 2001).
The long conflict between the FMLN and the government/ARENA coalition came to a head in 1989,
when the FMLN began to gain ground in their largest offensive of the war in the capital city of San
Salvador. The Right reacted to the offensive with the military-backed murder of six Jesuit priests, their
housekeeper, and her daughter at the University of Central America (UCA) which shook worldwide
opinion of the Salvadoran military (Studemeister 2001). Though atrocities occurred throughout the war,
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including the killing and disappearance of thousands of civilians, after the murders at UCA, U.S. funding
to the Central American country became contingent upon finding and prosecuting those responsible for
the tragedy (Strong 1990). After the murders at UCA, the U.S. withheld fifty percent of its planned
military aid to the country, though the amount withheld was later released to El Salvador by the State
Department (Doggett 1991). Though it could be said that this event influenced the end of the war, it
was at this time that conveniently the Cold War was also coming to an end.
As both sides realized that they had reached a stalemate in the conflict, discussions for settling the
long civil war began. Though the stalemate was reached in 1989, it was not until January 16, 1992, after
long efforts at negotiation and settlement with the help of the United Nations, that both sides signed
the Chapultepec Peace Accords in Mexico City (Studemeister 2001). The United Nations Observer
Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) provided an extended presence for the implementation of the Peace
Accords. Other important functions of the accords included: elections in 1994, continued UN mediation,
guidelines for institution-building, the development of civil society and rule of law, and a program to
promote reconciliation (Whitfield 2001). In addition to the goals of the accords, the Truth Commission
for El Salvador was developed as a body of international participants charged with creating a report on
the war, offering recommendations to address the findings, fortifying state institutions, eliminating
structural causes of violence while preventing repetition of past violence, and promoting reconciliation.
The report issued by the Truth Commission on March 15, 1993, found the Salvadoran state to be
responsible for the majority of human rights violations, but found that the FMLN had also committed
serious abuses. Though many parties were indicted by the report, including members of the judiciary
system, there have never been any prosecutions of mentioned offenders because of the passing of the
Salvadoran Amnesty Law, which allowed perpetrators of war crimes to avoid answering for them
(Popkin 2001). The rationale for this amnesty was that it would help to end the war and move the
country forward. The UN assisted with transition to democracy and disarmament following the conflict
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by declaring the FMLN a legitimate opposition political party that could participate in elections
(Montgomery 1995).
Mozambique
The southeast African country of Mozambique has followed a pattern close to that of many other
African countries in terms of colonization and independence. Colonized by the Portuguese,
Mozambique fought for its independence and in June of 1975 the Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique, or Frelimo, came into power as the group that led the liberation movement against
Portuguese colonizers backed by apartheid South Africa and the West. During the conflict Frelimo was
backed by the Soviet Union and China which influenced the post-colonial period in which Frelimo began
to reshape Mozambique. The socialist ideals and revolutionary fervor of the conflict were prominent in
the party’s governing principles and policies (Venâncio and Chan 1998).
After years of colonization, Frelimo not only had to overcome the legacies of colonialism, such as
poverty and economic dependence, but it also had to unite Mozambicans in a country where citizens
fought on both sides of the war for independence, though it was a minority that stood against
independence. There also existed a division between people who had experienced liberated zones
during the war for independence and those who had not. Many Mozambicans were not exposed to
Frelimo during the liberation struggle and Frelimo sought to familiarize unacquainted groups with the
party’s ideology and encourage participation in government and decision making (Isaacman and
Issacman 1983). Frelimo’s attempts at national unity included travel by high-level government officials
to isolated regions, daily broadcasts declaring all citizens Mozambicans, and a declaration by President
Samora Machel who stated, “We do not recognize tribes, regions, race or religious beliefs. We only
recognize Mozambicans who are equally exploited and equally desirous of freedom and revolution”
(Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 112). However, with Frelimo’s assertion that everyone was first and
foremost Mozambican also came curtailed political freedoms, the insistence that citizens support the
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new agenda and re-education camps for those who did not offer support (Weinstein 2002). Frelimo’s
rationale in this was to try and unite a population that was trying to find a national identity.
As Frelimo attempted to build a country, Rhodesia and South Africa were busy organizing the
Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) and in June 1976 Renamo began essentially as a foreigncreated insurgency (Manning 2004). Renamo was used by Rhodesia and South Africa to destabilize
Mozambique, as the white minority governments of those countries felt a successful black government
to be a threat to apartheid and their continued rule (Venâncio and Chan 1998). Finnegan identifies
three specific reasons for Rhodesia and South Africa’s desire to destabilize Mozambique through
Renamo: 1) they wanted to stop Frelimo’s support of the liberation movments in their countries,
especially African National Congress (ANC) which was a leading force in the South African liberation
movement, 2) they wanted to increase the region’s economic dependence on South Africa in the region
by sabotaging ports in Mozambique, therefore forcing landlocked countries to ship through South
Africa, and 3) they wanted to show that majority rule in Africa could never work, and they used this as a
justification for apartheid (Finnegan 1992).
Renamo was a foreign created entity, but over time the dynamics of Mozambique’s politics led to
more local support. Unpopular and failed Frelimo policies, such as nationalization campaigns and
collectivist agricultural policies, generated anti-Frelimo sentiment among parts of the country’s peasant
population (Weinstein 2002). Lack of food led many young rural men to join Renamo, as access to a gun
not only provided a way to combat starvation, but joining the movement became more acceptable as
anti-Frelimo sentiment grew (Venâncio and Chan 1998). Undoubtedly, however, the majority of
Renamo party participants were forcibly recruited and often coerced (Schafer 2001). Regional divisions
influenced political partisanship in Mozambique, with Frelimo support concentrated in the southern part
of the country and some northern provinces. Renamo drew support from the central portion of the
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country and remaining northern provinces. While many African countries experience ethnic divides, in
Mozambique “the most relevant political distinctions are regional rather than ethnic” (Lemon 2007).
The war between Frelimo and Renamo, which started in 1976 and ended in a peace agreement in
1992, took the lives of an estimated 900,000 people (Finnegan 1992). Both sides in this conflict
committed atrocities and human rights violations, but Renamo’s reputation for particularly brutal
practices during the conflict including mass, indiscriminate violence against civilians led it to be dubbed
a “movement from Hell” (Finnegan 1992; Hultman 2009). Renamo received funding from a number of
right-wing groups such as the Heritage Foundation in the United States and Europe, and anti-Frelimo
groups in Portugal and South Africa, all of whom were against the Marxist Frelimo government during a
time in which Cold War politics heavily influenced the international political culture (Young 1990;
Venâncio and Chan 1998). Despite the United States’ desire to curb the spread of communism as
Renamo emerged in opposition to the socialist Frelimo, the U.S. State Department openly struggled with
supporting the brutal practices of the movement and Renamo failed to establish itself as a legitimate
political organization in the eyes of the U.S. Regardless of the lack of open support from the State
Department, Renamo had supporters in the United States in the form of conservative think-tanks and
foundations, and representatives of Renamo were known to meet on occasion with people close to
President Ronald Reagan (Young 1990).
The end of the war came in 1992 at the end of the Cold War, and after sixteen years of fighting both
sides were struggling to maintain their armies. The absence of incoming money from South Africa for
Renamo and Cuba and the USSR’s inability to continue support of the Frelimo government caused
money to dry up. Simultaneously, ideological differences were fading between the two parties. The
groundwork for the end of the war was laid by the Catholic Church, which advocated for peace
beginning in the early 1980s. The UN used the foundation laid by the Catholic Church by helping with a
peace accord and boosting international financial incentives for disarmament (Weinstein 2002).
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After several attempts at a negotiated settlement, the General Peace Agreement, or GPA, was
signed in Rome on October 4, 1992. The GPA was brokered by the government of Italy over more than a
year long period during eleven rounds, and observed by major donors including the U.S., Germany,
Portugal, and Great Britain. The GPA called for a heavy UN presence in the country’s transition process
(Manning and Malbrough 2010). The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was
established in December 1992, a few months after the signing of the peace agreement. ONUMOZ and
other important players, such as the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the UK who
were major donors that comprised the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), served as
important bodies for implementing the peace process. ONUMOZ served as a UN military contingent
tasked with bringing stability during a volatile transition period and observing activities such as
elections. The CSC was made up of five commissions with specific responsibilities, such as the CeaseFire Commission and the Re-Integration Commission, aimed at supervising these significant aspects of
the transition (Venâncio and Chan 1998).
While the political settlement between Frelimo and Renamo ended armed hostilities and
opened the door for elections, the settlement lacked resolve in holding those responsible for atrocities
accountable. There has been no truth commission or body to oversee and investigate human rights
violations both during and after the conflict, due to Frelimo’s quick implementation of Amnesty Law No.
15/92 which excused crimes committed between 1979 and 1992 (Igreja 2010). Renamo and Frelimo
both “decided to shun legal mechanisms to hold accountable individuals who were allegedly responsible
for committing wartime abuses and crimes” though it could also be argued that there weren’t many
legal mechanisms present in Mozambique to address these issues despite the parties’ decision to avoid
efforts to hold war criminals accountable (Igreja 2010, 51). The country of Mozambique came out of the
conflict with assistance from the UN to establish a new government structure and hold elections in
order to move forward after over a decade of civil conflict.
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Cambodia
The southeast Asian country of Cambodia also has a tumultuous past of regime change and
violence. The country was under French protection and became part of French Indochina in the late
1800s. Throughout World War II until 1945, Cambodia was occupied by the Japanese. It was at this time
that the country gained independence after 90 years of colonial rule. The Sihanouk royal family ruled
independent Cambodia in the 1960s, but opposition to the monarchy arose with the Khmer’s People’s
Revolutionary Party. The party was an assorted group led by Ieng Sary and Saloth Sar, who would later
be known as Pol Pot, and they called for an armed struggle against the Sihanouk regime (Form 2009).
The United States and its involvement in Vietnam influenced the direction of the conflict. The Sihanouk
government was neutral in the Vietnam War and the U.S. became concerned that North Vietnam was
maintaining military bases in Cambodia. In 1969, the U.S. conducted bombing campaigns destabilizing
the country and supported a coup d’état in 1970 by General Lon Nol that drove Sihanouk into exile.
Allied with the U.S., the Lon Nol government allowed U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese bases in
Cambodia. The Lon Nol government was divided, corrupt and too weak to face off against the
communist insurgency aided by Northern Vietnam. By 1975, the U.S. failed to give it the support it
needed and the government collapsed, surrendering to the Khmer Rouge. On April 17, 1975, Pol Pot
and the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh and the government of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) began.
The years 1975 to 1979 were a particularly violent and oppressive time in Cambodia’s history, as the
Khmer Rouge went to extreme lengths to revolutionize the country in terms of shutting off the country
from the rest of the world, collectivizing agriculture and compelling forced labor, as well as silencing
dissidents (Menzel 2007). It is estimated that approximately two million people were murdered or died
from the harsh conditions of life under the Khmer Rouge (Chandler 2008). Starvation, untreated
disease, overwork in the fields and execution are examples of the extreme conditions during the autogenocide, meaning that the government systematically exterminated its own citizens. The bodies of the
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deceased were often dumped in mass graves or “killing fields” which were found all over Cambodia after
the conflict ended (Menzel 2007).
The Democratic Kampuchea (DK) revolution came to an end in 1979 as the Vietnamese, with whom
Cambodians had historically experienced political conflict, invaded and took control of Phnom Penh.
Despite the horrific atrocities of the Khmer Rouge period, the United States aligned itself with the DK (its
leadership remaining unchanged in exile) in order to stand firmly against Vietnam and their invasion of
Cambodia (Chandler 2008). The Vietnamese quickly established a new government called the People’s
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) which was led by defectors from Cambodia’s Communist Party who fled
from Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Many Cambodians welcomed being saved from the Khmer
Rouge and the expanded personal freedoms under the PRK, but there were many who opposed the new
foreign government and did not want to tolerate another period of socialist policies. As the PRK became
more self-sufficient and Soviet aid decreased as the Cold War came to an end, the Vietnamese withdrew
from Cambodia in September 1989 (Chandler 2008).
A peace settlement was reached between the Coalition Government of the Democratic Kampuchea
(CGDK) and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) on August 28, 1991 after a month of talks in Paris
among the four major parties in Cambodia. The CGDK had been supported by China, ASEAN, the U.S.
and other Western nations throughout the 1980s to wage war on the government in Phnom Penh, while
the PRK was supported by Vietnamese allies and served as a puppet regime for the Vietnamese in
Cambodia (Curtis 1998). Both sides of the conflict were largely supported, controlled and funded by
foreign entities. The Paris Peace Agreement (PPA) was signed in October of 1991 and the royalist
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia party
(FUNCINPEC), with CGDK alliance, and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), with PRK alliance, ended up
with a power sharing agreement as a new Cambodian government emerged (Roberts 2002). Hun Sen,
who had become prime minister of the PRK in 1985 with Vietnamese support, consolidated power and
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became the leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), also supported by Vietnam. Though the Paris
Peace Agreement created a quadripartite of power with the CPP and FUNCINPEC as the principle
leaders, the other parties included in the power-sharing coalition, Molinaka and the Buddhist Liberal
Democracy Party (BLDP), proved to be insignificant. A power struggle emerged between the CPP and
the FUNCINPEC as the two dominant parties in a quadripartite coalition. Ultimately, the PPA led to a
settlement which “reflected a U.S. requisite based on a view of conflict resolution that is in line with the
Kissinger dictum: ‘the standard method of solving civil war…is to make [contestants] govern jointly’”
(Roberts 2002, 522).
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge would not
addressed for over thirty years. The delay was due to many factors, including internal power struggles
between Cambodian political parties, differences in opinion on how the trials of former Khmer Rouge
members should be handled, and continued Khmer Rouge representation of Cambodia in the UN as the
Western world continued to condemn the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Menzel 2007). Though
some former Khmer Rouge officials were indicted in 2007 for war crimes and crimes against humanity,
establishing the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (E.C.C.C.) and trying them has been
a slow process. The E.C.C.C. was initiated when Cambodia approached the UN in the late 1990s for
assistance conducting a trial of responsible officials of the Khmer Rouge. The tribunal is a hybrid court
consisting of Cambodian and international judges (Dicklitch and Malik, 2010). Though the trials began in
2007, the process has suffered from a multitude of delays including the age of the accused being in the
80s, the dysfunctional Cambodian judicial system under which the E.C.C.C. is required to operate,
concerns about political interference with tribunal judges, and concerns about the general lack of
experience and training in international criminal law of Cambodian judges and prosecutors (Menzel
2007).
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After the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, the United Nations attempted to organize and
administer peace in Cambodia with the United Nations Transnational Authority on Cambodia (UNTAC).
UNTAC’s authority included, “civil administration, military operations, administration of elections and
human rights monitoring,” to supervise the execution of various components of the PPA (Ratner 1993,
12). In 1993, with the help of UNTAC’s 20,000 police, soldiers, and aid workers, Cambodia had its first
successful post-conflict election (Gottesman 2003). The intervention of the UN and other external
actors (such as the U.S., ASEAN, China and Vietnam) who supported one side or the other during the
peace agreement negotiations, has allowed the country to remain relatively peaceful since 1993.
Free and Fair Elections
Free and fair elections are an integral component for evaluating a democratic transition. Before
examining each party’s performance in elections, it is important to assess the fairness of elections in
Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique following the end of the wars. Outside groups have put forth
differing opinions on how free and fair Cambodian elections have been since the transition. After the
1998 elections observers from Japan, France, the European Union and ASEAN all publicly declared the
elections to be free and fair. However, nonprofit organizations such as the National Democratic
Institute and International Republican Institute were among the groups that did not find the elections to
be free and fair. The National Democratic Institute in particular criticized Cambodia’s National Election
Committee (NEC) for lack of transparency and CPP control over the NEC (Peou 1998). In evaluations of
more recent elections, the UN has been critical of the NEC’s bias towards CPP and the Asian Network for
Free Elections (ANFREL) said of the 2008 elections that “although some aspects of the election process
had improved compared to previous polls—including a reduction in violence—the process as a whole
could not be regarded as fair” (McCargo 2010, 83).
In El Salvador the observing body called the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), created by the United
Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), supervised the elections from start to finish and
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determined that they “had been carried out under adequate conditions of liberty, competitiveness, and
security” (Montogmery 1995, 155). Despite this assessment, some point to procedural problems like
defects in voter registration, unfair distribution of campaign funds, and rejection of voter registration
cards as possible reasons for the ARENA victory, as well as voter fear and intimidation sparked by ARENA
campaign imagery that “focused on images of destruction from the war” (Wantchekon 1999, 829). Yet,
the continuation of peace after the election was a welcome result that indicated that democratic
practices could be successful in El Salvador.
In Mozambique, observers of the elections, such as the EU Observer Mission and the Carter Center
and Commonwealth observers have disputed results and closed door meetings of the National Electoral
Commission (CNE) to examine polling station results sheets containing errors (Lemon 2007). 2
Complaints were voiced after the 2004 elections, with Renamo alleging harassment at the hands of state
election officials and the police. Though the observers were eventually granted the right to view the
tabulation of the faulted polling sheets through a computer link, CNE meetings continue to be held
behind closed doors (Lemon 2007). The body has received ample criticism for lack of transparency and
manipulating election rules to favor Frelimo (Manning 2010).
Though the fairness of the elections in Mozambique has been questioned, Frelimo has been winning
elections because people are voting to return them to power. However, given the circumstances, that is
hard to confirm. As a result, in 2009 Freedom House dropped Mozambique from its list of electoral
democracies and it was found “on voting day itself, a significant share of election officials across several
provinces engaged in systematic, large-scale, and direct manipulation of the results” (Manning 2010,

2

The National Elections Commission, or CNE, developed in 1994 to run elections has been accused of a lack of
transparency and bias towards Frelimo since its creation.
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152).3 According to Anthony Lemon complaints, were somewhat justified;, however the misconduct is
not enough to change the outcome of the election (Lemon 2007).
Overall, observers have come to different conclusions in each of these countries. Freedom House’s
most recent assessments of elections in Cambodia characterize them as not free and fair. There have
been major issues preventing free and fair elections including vote-buying, lack of neutrality in election
authorities, continued harassment of opposition parties through violence and intimidation, and the
prevention of one-fifth of registered voters from casting ballots in 20084 (Hughes 2012). Freedom
House’s assessment of El Salvador’s elections in 2010 stated that, “Since the end of the armed conflict in
1992, elections have been carried out with relatively strong guarantees against fraud and intimidation,
and verified by domestic and international observers” which shows an overall characterization of free
and fair elections in the country (Holiday 2010, 174). The Carter Center’s observers of Mozambique’s
2004 elections found that though elections were peaceful, there were serious irregularities that
prevented transparent free and fair elections, including not allowing eligible voters with legitimate
registration to vote if their names weren’t on the list (leading to low voter turnout), and partiality of the
CNE to Frelimo (Carter Center 2004). Freedom House included Mozambique in its 2007 Countries at the
Crossroads Report and the report stated, “the elections were peaceful, but election observers noted
serious electoral deficiencies, including ballot-box stuffing, the politicization of the National Election
Commission (CNE), and a lack of transparency” confirming the assessment by the Carter Center that
although the elections were peaceful, they were not free or fair (Lloyd 2007).

3

Additionally, many rural residents in Mozambique have been excluded from participation in elections due to
isolation because of poor infrastructure (Weinstein 2002; Lemon 2007).
4
Local authorities in Cambodia have been known to recruit voters to the polls whom they know will vote for the
CPP and turn away voters whom they expect to vote for the opposition. In the 2008 elections, those who were
turned away were done so due to lack of appropriate documentation and/or their names not being found on the list.
Though in the best-run elections voters who lack documentation and whose names aren't on voter lists are turned
away, it should be noted that election authorities in Cambodia are not neutral and authorities have the reputation for
recruiting voters that support the CPP. Instead of giving these voters provisional ballots, poll workers simply turned
people away in the instances described in Hughes’ work.
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Party Performance in Elections
Democratization has played an important part in the conflict to peacetime transition period. New
democracies in the transition period are particularly fragile, and an effort by both sides to sustain the
peace and become active, participating members is essential as party members go from soldiers to
politicians (de Zeeuw 2008). There are many ways to measure democracy. Scholars look at factors such
as elections, public support, respect for civil and political rights, participation, the rule of law, and
emergence of democratic institutions and civil society to assess the success of the transition and parties
in the post-conflict period (Diamond 1999).
The political parties addressed in this paper all have adapted to fit a new democratic landscape in
their own ways. The political parties of Mozambique have faced several electoral contests since the end
of the civil war in 1992. Founding elections are an important time for political actors functioning within
a newly democratic system, though it is important to note that this is not the only measure of party
transition to democratization. According to Manning:
The first electoral process in 1994 created a degree of uncertainty to which neither Frelimo nor
Renamo was accustomed. But the first successful completions of elections constituted an important
first step in building trust both in the system and in the willingness of one’s political opponents to
abide by that system (Manning 2001, 151).
This quote demonstrates the importance of the political actors’ adherence to the new system to
maintain order in the post-conflict period. Also essential is that when Renamo objected to electoral
outcomes, it used established channels to voice its opposition, further demonstrating this particular
party’s commitment to the new system (Manning 2001).
Elections in Mozambique are marked by regional divisions rather than the ethnic divisions
experienced in many other African countries. Mozambique’s divide exists between the northern, central
and southern provinces and the division has been reinforced by economic disparity, with the majority of
direct foreign investment, aid and aid agencies flooding into the southern part of Mozambique (Lemon
2007). As mentioned earlier, Frelimo primarily draws its support from the far northern and southern
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regions, while Renamo’s support tends to reside in the central provinces and parts of the north
(Weinstein 2002). In recent years, however, Renamo’s support has greatly decreased even in their
former strongholds. In 2004, in Mozambique’s third general election after the end of the conflict in
1994, Renamo remained a strong opposition party led by Alfonso Dhlakama, earning 33.7 percent of the
vote. But the party has failed to build on that percentage and has remained stagnant, earning around 30
percent of the vote in presidential elections since 1994 (Manning 2008). The presidency has eluded
Renamo throughout the post-conflict electoral processes and additional troubles have arisen in the loss
of parliamentary seats. Since 1999 Renamo has seen a decline in its parliamentary power, losing its
majority in the 2003 local elections in four of the six provinces where it led in 1999 (Lemon 2007).
Frelimo’s Armando Guebuza was victorious in the 2004 election and was re-elected president in 2009.
Additionally, Frelimo controlled 192 out of 248 parliamentary seats as of 2009 and possessed pluralities
in all eleven provinces (Africa Confidential 2009). Renamo’s organizational weaknesses and Frelimo’s
access to better funding and financial assets, a benefit of incumbency, have allowed it to consolidate
control and maintain a monopoly on political power in recent years (Manning 2010). This idea of
political monopoly despite having elections, sometimes called electoral authoritarianism, will be
discussed in the Chapter 5 analysis of these cases. Renamo’s decline in power over the years and
Frelimo’s consolidation of power are highlighted in Table 3.1 below.
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Table 3.1 Mozambican Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results, 1994-2009
Year

Party
Frelimo
Pres. (% of vote)

Renamo

1994

53.3

Parl. (Number of
Seats)
129

Pres. (% of votes)
33.7

Parl. (Number of
Seats)
112

1999

52.3

133

47.7

117

2004

63.7

160

31.7

90

2009

75

191

16.4

51

Manning, C. (2010). Mozambique’s Slide into One-Party Rule. Journal of Democracy, 21(2), 153.

This table highlights the staggering lead in the polls that Frelimo has maintained over Renamo since
elections began in the post-conflict period. Frelimo has consistently garnered more than 50 percent of
the presidential vote and saw that number increase to 75 percent in 2009. Renamo’s percentage of the
presidential vote has declined from a high 47.7 percent in 1999 to only 16.4 percent in 2009 showing
that Renamo has done much worse. Similarly, their parliamentary numbers have been on the decline,
dropping from 112 seats in 1994 to only 51 seats in 2009. The increasingly dismal election results show
that Renamo is on the downside in Mozambique and in reality hardly exists as a contender. As a result,
Mozambique is becoming a dominant-party democracy with no significant opposition party. Though the
elections were marked by some irregularities, Frelimo’s victory still boasted numbers identifying it as the
clear winner since the 1994 elections and it has maintained control since. Identifying Frelimo as a clear
winner, however, is not proof of elections that are free and fair. Consolidation of power over time has
put Frelimo in a place where it does not need to cheat to win elections.
El Salvador’s Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed in 1992, but it was not until 1994 that the first
post-conflict election took place in El Salvador. Dubbed by many to be the “election of the century” this
singular event would prove to be telling of whether or not El Salvador’s dueling parties could maintain
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the newfound peace. The 1994 election featured candidates Ruben Zamora for the Democratic
Convergence, a left wing party with roots predominately tied to the FMLN, facing Armando Calderón Sol
of ARENA. After a run-off election between Calderón Sol and Zamora, ARENA ultimately emerged
victorious. However, according to Wantchekon, this result and later elections “led to pessimism about
the prospects for democratic consolidation in El Salvador,” due to ARENA’s continued domination and
the inability for the FMLN to break into the executive branch (Wantchekon 1999, 812). With little
chance of an alternation in power, the legitimacy of the democracy was imperiled.
In election years after the 1994 ARENA victory, the party continued to win the presidency, but the
FMLN earned successes in the legislative branch, increasing the percentage of seats every year since the
1994 elections. Not until March 2009, with the victory of Mauricio Funes, did the FMLN win the plurality
of seats in parliament and El Salvador’s executive branch (National Democratic Institute 2009). The
results of subsequent elections are highlighted in the Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below.
Table 3.2 Salvadoran Parliamentary Election Results, 1994-2009
Party Seats Earned
Year
ARENA

FLMN

Christian
Democratic
Party (PDC)

1994

39

21

1997

28

2000

Democratic
Movement
Convergence of Unity
(CD)
(MU)

18

Party of
National
Conciliation
(PCN)
4

1

1

27

9

11

2

1

29

31

5

14

0

0

2003

27

31

5

16

0

0

2006

34

32

6

11

0

0

2009

32

35

5

11

0

0

Álvarez-Rivera, M. (2012). Legislative Elections in El Salvador, Parts I and II. In Election Resources on the Internet.
Retrieved from http://electionresources.org/sv/index_en.html
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Table 3.3 Salvadoran Presidential Election Results, 1994-2009
Year

Presidential Election (% of vote)
ARENA

FMLN

1994

68 (in runoff)

32 (in runoff)

1999

51.96

29.05

2004

57.7

35.7

2009

48.7

51.3

Binghamton University. (2005). Election Results Archive: El Salvador. Retrieved from the Center on Democratic
Performance at Binghamton University Web site: http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/countries/els.html
National Democratic Institute, The. (2009). El Salvador Election Bulletin March 20, 2009. Washington, DC: Author.
Retrieved from: http://www.ndi.org/files/NDI%20El%20Salvador%20Election%20Bulletin-2009Mar20.pdf
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador. (2003). El Salvador—ONUSAL Background. In Completed
Peacekeeping Operations. Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusal.htm.
Wantchekon, L. (1999). Strategic Voting in Conditions of Political Instability: The 1994 Elections in El Salvador.
Comparative Political Studies, 32(7), 812.

The peaceful change of power at the executive level highlights one of the most basic measures of
democratic success. Compared to Mozambique and El Salvador, Cambodia’s elections have experienced
more complications. In Mozambique and El Salvador, there have consistently been two dominant
political parties, which grew out of the war and have vied for control through elections. In Cambodia,
several parties, some created both by the war and some after it, have stepped up and made headway in
elections. Though some scholars focus on two main parties, there have been other contenders besides
FUNCINPEC and the CPP. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), led by Sam Rainsy (the former finance minister
for FUNCINPEC), emerged to become competitive during the course of the transition (Vittal 2000).
Ultimately, however, the majority of executive power in Cambodia has been in the hands of the CPP’s
Hun Sen for two decades.
The complexities of Cambodian political parties, from their origination to the relationship in a
power-sharing structure, are immense. CPP leader Hun Sen defected from the DK during the Khmer
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Rouge period and fled to Vietnam. His ascent to power as Cambodia’s leader came with the Vietnambacked overthrow of the Khmer Rouge and he is one of Asia’s longest serving prime ministers. Over the
past 25 years he has essentially ruled Cambodia, concentrating his power by becoming the personality
of the CPP, increasing militarization of the party and his rule, and perpetuating his persona as a regal
and mystical leader (Heder 2011). Political parties in El Salvador and Mozambique also have party
leaders they can point to as formative and influential members of certain parties, but only Renamo’s
Alfonso Dhlakama rivals the personalism of Hun Sen and the CPP. In both cases, the parties are
inseparable from their respective leaders. Hun Sen’s immense and ever-increasing power as Cambodia’s
long-time leader (through undermining and silencing of opponents, as well as militarizing his rule and
propagating his mysticism as a Cambodia’s true royal leader) has overshadowed the other political
parties that were part of the power sharing agreement, such as FUNCINPEC, whose influence has been
in steady decline since the 1998 elections (Vittal 2000; Un and Legerwood 2003; Heder 2010). Hun Sen’s
rule has been characterized by some as an extension of the socialist regimes of the past in that as he has
succeeded in consolidating power, dissidents have been silenced and removed, voters have faced
intimidation, human rights remain a concern, and military ties to the CPP have increased (Heder 2011;
Un and Ledgerwood 2003).
FUNCINPEC, originally the senior partner in the power sharing agreement is a party with a royalist
history that was led by Prince Ranariddh, son of King Norodom Sihanouk, who had ruled over Cambodia
as a constitutional monarchy from 1941 to 1955, then again symbolically from 1993 to 2004. Ranariddh
was ousted by the CPP in a 1997 coup that greatly disrupted the settlement established by the Paris
Peace Agreement of the early 1990s (Vittal 2000). The struggle to balance power in the power-sharing
coalition broke down in July 1997, when the CPP and FUNCINPEC became engaged in conflict that forced
Ranariddh into exile as the CPP’s forces defeated FUNCINPEC. The power-sharing coalition itself was
said to be a deceitful play for greater power on the part of the CPP, as it afforded them more power
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than they were shown to have in popular polls at the time (Roberts 2002). The 1997 violence was a
result of four years of gradual buildup of tensions between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. The CPP’s
stonewalling of FUNCINPEC officials into grass-roots level positions, meaning in the smaller villages and
provinces instead of Phnom Penh, and Ranariddh’s continuing loss of “power and face” led to the
increased tension (Roberts 2002). The complexities in reconciling power-sharing between the two
parties proved too much for the system to handle. Absolutism among CPP elites and the desire of
Ranariddh to undermine the CPP’s position are reasons for the lack of success in extended powersharing (Chandler 2002).
After Ranariddh’s exile, Ung Hout replaced him as the second prime minister for FUNCINPEC and
made an effort to work with Hun Sen, which immediately reduced tensions. Chandler notes that some
regard Ung Hout as more of Hun Sen’s puppet than fellow coalition leader. Depending on one’s
perspective, he served a more pliable coalition leader than Ranariddh (Chandler 2002). FUNCINPEC has
been seen as subordinate to the CPP, adopting a cooperative stance after the 1998 election that helped
with political stability, but did not bring them equal partnership in ruling. Ultimately, the party has
declined and has not been considered an alternative to Hun Sen’s party. Additionally, the party’s
reliance on its royal roots for mobilization, rather than managing Cambodia’s political reality and
conducting more grassroots efforts, alienated FUNCINPEC from some former supporters and prevented
it from gaining new support (Un and Legerwood 2003).
After twenty years, the coalition of parties still exists in Cambodia. The 2008 elections resulted in
five different parties elected into the National Assembly, with the CPP holding the majority. Hun Sen
still serves as Cambodia’s prime minister, and the previously exiled Ranariddh broke with FUNCINPEC
and formed his own party, the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP). Sam Rainsy heads Cambodia’s
strongest opposition party the SRP, and is known in particular for protesting inflation and CPP’s control
over electoral machinery (Hughes 2002). SRP protest has drawn government harassment in the form of
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legal action against Sam Rainsy for his alleged defamatory remarks against Hun Sen, and his
condemnation of government influence with the opening of rural SRP offices, the intimidation of party
activists and vandalism of party signboards (Hughes 2002). Analysts agree that since the end of the war
in 1997 and the consolidation of CPP power, the government in Cambodia has become more intolerant
of freedom of expression. The Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, or COMFREL, reports
that:
Government officials have filed recent lawsuits against political activists including members of the
Sam Rainsy Party, Mu Sochua and Ho Vann, and other prominent journalists and individuals. These
activists had raised their voices and concerns against the mismanagement of public services, with
the constructive aim of remedying the situation. Sam Rainsy, the leader of the opposition Sam
Rainsy Party (SRP), and member of National Assembly Ho Vann went into self-imposed exile citing
fear of arrest after the National Assembly voted to remove their parliamentary immunity
(Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia 2010).
COMFREL’s report on these legal actions against opposition parties underscores the CPP’s efforts to
suppress resistance.
In addition to dominating the executive branch, the CPP has continued to gain parliamentary
seats. In 2008, they increased their number of parliamentary seats from 73 to 90, with the Sam Rainsy
Party gaining two seats at 26, the Human Rights Party with 3 seats, FUNCINPEC with only 2 seats, and
the League for Democracy Party with 1 seat (Freedom House 2011). The distribution of parliamentary
seats may be the most telling evidence of FUNCINPEC’s decline over the years; in 2008 it had only two
members of parliament, down from 43 in 1998 (Peou 1998). Table 3.4 below summarizes election
results for Cambodia’s National Assembly from 1993 to 2008.
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Table 3.4 National Assembly Seats (Lower House) in Cambodia, 1993-2008.
Year

National Assembly Seats (out of 123)
CPP

FUNCIN.

SRP

Norodom
Ranariddh
Party
N/A

League for
Democracy
Party
N/A

Buddhist
Liberal
Dem Par.
10

Molinaka

N/A

Human
Rights
Party
N/A

1993

51

58

1998

64

43

15

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2003

73

26

24

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2008

90

2

26

3

N/A

1

N/A

N/A

1

Hughes, C. (2002). Parties, Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia. Democratization 9(3), 165-186.
McCargo, D. (2010). Cambodia. In J. Dizard, C. Walker, & S. Cook (Eds.), Countries at the Crossroads 2010: An
Analysis of Democratic Governance, by Freedom House (pp 81-102). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.
Nohlen, D., Grotz, F. & Hartmann,C. (2001). Elections in Asia: A Data Handbook, Volume II. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Weggel, O. (2007). Cambodia in 2006: Self-Promotion and Self-Deception. Asian Survey, 47(1), 141-147.

Elections and Democratic Theory
The elections that have taken place in these countries since the end of the conflicts have been a
means for transition of power, public participation in a democratic system and have served as a basic
measure for democracy. Democratic theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter, Samuel Huntington and
Adam Przeworski are minimalists in their views of democracy, essentially defining democracy as “a
system in which rules are selected by competitive elections” (Przeworski 1999, 12). Additionally,
Przeworski points to some factors that contribute to an increased likelihood of a democracy surviving
over an extended period of time. The nation’s wealth, a lack of a dominant political force, and the
ability for voters to choose leaders through elections are important factors in extending the life of a
democratic government (Przeworski 1999). While theorists like Przeworski do outline factors that may
contribute to the longevity of a democracy, in an electoral democracy, free and fair elections and the
peaceful transition of power are the most important defining factors.
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Some democratic theorists disagree with Przeworski’s electoral democratic view. Liberal democratic
thought cites factors like the protection of human rights, reserved domains of power for the military,
vertical accountability, and far-reaching provisions for political and civic pluralism and rule of law as
important democratic measures (Diamond 1999). Diamond’s definition of liberal democracy which
identifies “a political system in which individual and group liberties are well protected and in which
there exist autonomous spheres of civil society and private life, insulated from state control” pinpoints
factors that extend beyond the formal and intermediate conceptions of electoral democracy (Diamond
1999, 3). While Diamond clearly differentiates between electoral and liberal democracy, he does
recognize that democracy is far too complex to fit into this simple dichotomy. Basic definitions from
both the electoral and liberal schools of thought show the broad spectrum of definitions possible when
attempting to characterize democracy.
If measuring democracy simply based on the regular holding of elections, El Salvador, Mozambique,
and Cambodia have all had some level of success. The transition in all three has been peaceful
compared to their conflict periods; however, not all of these elections would be considered free and
fair. The CPP is tightening its grip on power and resources, and according to COMFREL, has been
steadily decreasing tolerance against freedom of expression while meeting dissidents with force
(COMFREL 2010; McCargo 2010). In Mozambique, intimidation of voters has been reported and the
government can be accused of not doing enough to overcome isolation of the rural populace and allow
them to become full participants in the emerging political system (Lemon 2007; Weinstein 2002). In El
Salvador, difficulties in traveling to the polls to vote led to high numbers of absentions, or lack of eligible
voters actually casting their ballots, in the 1994 elections directly following the conflict. Additionally,
requirements such as expensive documentation in a country still wrought with poverty and non-receipt
of voting cards added to lack of participation in the voting process for many Salvadorans in the 1994
elections (Vilas 1996).
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Elections and their outcomes, along with aspects of liberal democratic theory, are important
parts of assessing democratic transitions and their success. Free and fair elections provide the most
basic function of a democracy in that they provide the possibility of transition of power, but the other
aspects of a liberal democracy, including human rights protections, are important factors to measure as
well, especially in countries where human rights have been completely disregarded during the wars.
Though occurrence of free and fair elections provide the initial measure to identify whether or not a
transition is taking place; this success does not signify that a real democratic transition is occurring.
Public Support for Democracy
Public support for democracy is crucial to democratic longevity and consolidation. It is important
that democracy be accepted into the national and political culture to truly take hold. One of the most
comprehensive resources measuring support for democracy in El Salvador and throughout Latin America
is the Latinóbarometer. When surveyed in 2010, 59 percent of Salvadorans asked agreed that
“Democracy was preferable to any other kind of government.” Though 68 percent answered this way in
a 2009 report only a year earlier, it is promising that over half of those surveyed still felt that democracy
is the preferable form of government (Latinóbarometer 2010, 25).
Afrobarometer asks and measures answers for similar questions in African countries. The results of
the 2008 survey yielded the following results for Mozambique presented in Table 3.5:
Table 3.5 Mozambican Public Opinion on Civil Liberties
Survey Question: In this country
how free are you to
Say what you think?

Respondents that answered
“completely free”
47%

Join any political organization
you want?
To choose who to vote for
without feeling pressured?

50%
64%

Pereira, A. and Shenga, C. (2008). Summary of Results: Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Mozambique. In
Afrobarometer. Retrieved from
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/summary_results/moz_r4_sor.pdf
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These numbers are interesting as they support the Freedom House assessment declaring Mozambique’s
elections not free or fair. Another telling statistic from this survey shows fewer than 50percent of the
citizens surveyed believed that citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of their leaders,
demonstrating the country is more divided than the elections show, which could leave room for another
party, besides Renamo, to win influence in Mozambique (Afrobarometer 2008).
What do these responses mean when assessing how democracy is functioning in El Salvador and
Mozambique? In some ways, the numbers provide good indicators for how the general public feels
about democracy. This is of utmost importance in a successful transition; however, one must be careful
in putting too much stock into the numbers provided in these surveys. “Satisfaction with democracy” or
SWD is difficult to measure and there is a lack of consensus on what SWD does in fact measure. For
example, SWD may have diverse meanings to different respondents of a survey, or survey respondents
may think their replies should measure their support for authorities and not system support, or support
of democracy as a form of government in general. If satisfaction with democracy essentially means
different things to different people this can compromise the data collected from surveys (Canache,
Mondak and Seligson 2001). Satisfaction with democracy could ultimately said to be dependent on how
well represented a country’s citizens feel by those in power. Items such as political engagement,
participation, and embodiment of the people’s views both by parties and in election results are
important factors in influencing satisfaction with democracy (McAllister 2005).
Yet surveys are extremely important in measuring the way citizens feel about the developing
democracy in a transition period. In 2003 the National Democratic Institute (NDI) conducted a study
prior to that year’s elections featuring twelve focus groups, with two groups in each of Cambodia’s six
provinces. When asking the focus groups about democracy and freedom, the 2003 NDI study reports:
The participants take satisfaction with what they see as the increasing freedom in the country over
the past 10 years. The three elections that have taken place since 1993 are the most evident
manifestation of the country’s democratic advances and have produced what one opinion leader in
Phnom Penh called a “free multiparty democracy” (Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner 2003, 4).
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Though general, this statement paints a picture of Cambodian public opinion of democracy in the years
following the end of the war. Unfortunately there has been no follow up report by NDI to measure the
public’s satisfaction with improvements over the last ten years since this poll was conducted.
The peacetime political parties in Mozambique, El Salvador, and Cambodia have all faced, and
undoubtedly to some degree, created for themselves, obstacles on the path towards functioning in a
democratic society. Cambodian political parties have perhaps had the most visible difficulty in this
endeavor. There the democratic transition was interrupted by a coup in 1997. There have also been
accusations of assassination attempts and complaints of political parties that “operate through
exclusionary and hierarchal clientelism, inclining towards a politics of charismatic leadership and
mobilization around politicized identities, rather than a politics of representation” (Hughes 2002, 167).
Cambodia’s journey to democracy has been far from easy. It could be argued that the journey to
democracy is seldom easy, and Mozambique and El Salvador have also faced setbacks as well.
There are also a number of secondary institutions that support democracy and rule of law which are
seen as important measures of consolidation. Civil society is essentially the assortment of groups that
represent collective interests or means for citizens to engage in the community (Tusalem 2007). A lively
and vibrant civil society can be an important component for consolidation, but it should not be
considered a universal measure of transition. Other components including, free and fair elections and
rule of law, serve as important measure of transition as well.
There is some evidence of growth of civil society in Cambodia. Despite some setbacks, the
Cambodian people have taken the initiative to be heard in the post-war environment (Hughes 2002). In
particular, the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) has created a guide for the idea of ‘sit-in’ in Cambodia by
conducting peaceful protests in opposition to the CPP (Hughes 2002). The establishment of peaceful
urban protest, and the state’s willingness to allow such protest has amounted to a some openness for
political parties other than the CPP, and for the Cambodian people. As Hughes states, “the ‘sit-in’ offers
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a space of political significance that can be appropriated by those who would previously have had only
violence or vagrancy available to them” (Hughes 2002, 177). In a society that has known such
oppression, this is an important benchmark in the advancement of the Cambodian democratic system.
The coming about of the sit-in in Cambodian politics is a bright spot which shows that there are
significant numbers of people in the country who believe that they can bring about change. The
development of this kind of direct action in Cambodia can be seen as evidence of growth of civil society.
Though civic activism is a positive development and civil society has expanded in Cambodia, as the CPP
has consolidated power, opposition to the party has been met with increasing force (Heder 2011). The
bulk of Cambodian civil society is composed of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that seek to
support economic development, human rights, and democratic development. However, Hun Sen’s
government “restricts the public space and refuses to accept the legitimacy of human rights and
democracy NGOs,” considering only the NGOs that focus on economic development to be significant (Un
2006, 238).
There is also evidence of growth of civil society in Mozambique and El Salvador. In Mozambique
there has been an increase in the number of NGOs which have focused on promoting reconciliation
between Frelimo and Renamo, and combating health issues such as the AIDS crisis. There has
additionally been growth in the organizing and presence of women’s groups. Approximately 50
women’s organizations have emerged in the post-conflict period, compared to one state-controlled
women’s organization during the conflict. The emerging organizations are autonomous and focus
predominately on the law, economic development and violence against women (Disney 2003).
Previously only mobilized to support Frelimo during the conflict, women’s groups in Mozambique, such
as the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) have begun “organizing themselves for feminist
political change, to varying degrees, within an autonomous ‘civil society’ today” (Disney 2003, 534).
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El Salvador has also developed a stronger civil society and has seen a growing presence of NGOs
since the end of the civil conflict. For example, there was civic engagement of groups opposed to the
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), primarily the Iniciativa Mesoamericano Comercio,
Integración y Desarollo (Iniciativa CID) and Foro Mesoamericano (Spalding 2007). While the NGO
presence in El Salvador has been good at engaging grassroots in the development of participation in
public life, in other cases organization has been top-down in orientation and “grassroots constituencies
were merely recipients of services and not active, engaged members” (Jamal 2012, 4). This is a
common pitfall when the development of civil society is spurred by Western donors with an interest in
democracy promotion, and it is something that is of concern in Mozambican and Cambodian civil society
as well.
Another important measure of democracy is the development of the rule of law, which has had
varied success in each of these cases. Determining the presence of rule of law is based on a number of
factors, the most important of which may be respect for fundamental rights and liberties of citizens and
the limitation of governmental powers (Kajcsa 2011). In countries where human rights and justice have
been fundamentally ignored during the conflicts, rule of law is important in promoting accountability
and in curbing crime, which is a principal threat to democracy (Call 2003). As the rule of law is
established we see shifts in how authority is viewed, as the government or military have functioned as
the only authority during the conflict years. Some changes in the rule of law stem from the peace
agreements that alter military involvement in civilian policing, by either reducing this function of the
military or suspending it all together. This was a key change in El Salvador where the military had strong
ties to ARENA and was responsible for thousands of civilian deaths during the civil war. International
influence and the peace agreements created by bringing warring sides to the table are important factors
in the development of rule of law as well (Popkin 2001).
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Though important for the development of rule of law, international pressure can sometimes lead
to a top-down approach where citizens do not gain legal empowerment in the form of “legal services,
legal capacity-building, and legal reform by and for disadvantaged populations” (Golub 2007, 48). One
chief concern in developing the rule of law in these post-conflict countries is judicial reform. In
Cambodia, the judicial system is extremely corrupt and has been made weak by Cambodian elites who
use the system for political manipulation through a patron-clientelism relationship (Un 2010; Freedom
House 2012). Similarly, Mozambique’s judicial system has been characterized as a collapsed system
where rulings are up for auction (Hanlon 2004). Also in 2010, one-third of those surveyed by
Afrobarometer said that they didn’t believe criminals were likely to face punishment for crimes
committed, showing a lack of faith in the system by Mozambican citizens (Afrobarometer 2010).
Freedom House called the country’s judicial system corrupt and backlogged, with scarce resources and
poor training of personnel (Freedom House 2012). The judicial system in El Salvador has historically
been politicized and though improvements have been made as the country has transitioned, the system
continues to struggle with being caught up in politics, is sluggish in processing cases, and in general is
not held in high esteem by the people. However, the system has improved in recent years by
demonstrating greater independence on a number of important cases (Call 2003; Freedom House 2012).
Yet perhaps the biggest threat to the rule of law and democracy in El Salvador is crime. According to
Latinóbarometer, 44 percent of citizens in 2010 cited crime as the biggest problem in El Salvador
(Latinóbarometer 2010). El Salvador has a serious crime issue, with criminal activities by gangs that
have even put it at risk of becoming a failed state. Chapter 4 will provide greater detail on this problem
in El Salvador.
Therefore, establishing the rule of law is difficult undertaking, especially in countries emerging from
war without reputable judicial systems or policing. In El Salvador, the UN mission established an Ad Hoc
Commission and Truth Commission to seek out and bring to justice war criminals and promote
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reconciliation. However, the Commission’s recommendations were largely ignored, and in 1993 and
amnesty law was passed allowing those who committed war crimes to avoid being brought to justice
(Popkin 2001). Similarly in Mozambique, an amnesty law was passed soon after the peace agreement,
also permitting war crimes in Mozambique to go unanswered (Igreja 2010). Cambodia waited 30 years
to address the crimes under the Khmer Rouge and the process has faced multiple delays even after the
establishment of the tribunal to prosecute war criminals.
Democratic Transition and Party Changes
Democratic transition and the factors that accompany this change are important to measure as
a country shifts from a conflict period to a peacetime setting. Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique
all agreed to undergo a governmental change and transition to democracy in the aftermath of war.
However, as this chapter indicates, the transition process is a long, filled with pitfalls, and varies
depending on a country’s past, political culture, the political actors’ willingness to commit to the change.
We turn next to a closer consideration of how parties adjust structurally and attitudinally to the postconflict period and attempt to remain relevant in an altered political situation.
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Chapter IV: Party Structural and Attitudinal Change
This chapter examines the structure and attitude changes the political parties of Cambodia, El
Salvador, and Mozambique made during the post-conflict period. Post-conflict transition periods, like
the ones Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique went through after each of their civil conflicts,
introduce changes in how transitioning parties function. The new and established parties must adjust to
the emerging political climate and re-tool their structures and alter attitudes in light of the political
transition (de Zeeuw 2008). Just as there are difficulties in adopting political systems, there is also
difficulty in implementing changes in the parties themselves. Undoubtedly, because they are the main
internal actors carrying out change during a country’s transition period, assessing political parties’ roles
and adaptation strategies in the new system is important. According to Przeworski, “they play the
central role in presenting alternatives and molding attitudes with regard to particular governments as
well as with regard to the very project of structural transformation” (Przeworski 1991, 88). This chapter
will examine how political parties change in the transition period. It will review demobilization efforts
and the reintegration of combatants into society, include an assessment of the parties’ efforts in gaining
supporters, and provide an analysis of how intra-party relations affect the transition period.
Changes in party structure and party attitude following the end of a conflict are important aspects of
the transition period. The post-conflict period introduces new challenges for both incumbent parties,
the parties with control of the government as the conflict ends, and insurgent parties, the parties which
played a revolutionary or insurgency role during the conflict. In the new political climate, guerilla
movements must re-organize and follow outlined peace agreements and lay down their arms and
sometimes integrate into the national military. Additionally, adopting a strategy to gain followers in a
new context is important as parties vie for elected positions. In some cases, party leaders seem to
naturally emerge. In others, party leaders or electoral candidates are not always clearly defined as the
country’s political situation changes. Incumbent political parties also face many challenges as they work
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to adapt to political change; however, “parties, as both survival-oriented and goal-oriented
organizations, are adaptive organizations and will adjust over time to their electoral environment (even
as they also, of course, play a role in shaping it)” (Manning 2007, 255). Parties make adjustments based
on their standings at the end of the conflict, based on their role in the conflict as either the incumbent
or insurgent party in order to be competitive as a new political climate emerges. Those parties that are
institutionalized are those that have spent time in power or have had a hold on the government’s
bureaucratic and military institutions. Incumbent parties (ARENA in El Salvador, the CPP in Cambodia
and Frelimo in Mozambique) typically have an easier time adjusting as they already possess the
necessary political structure and widespread influence to be competitive (de Zeeuw 2008). In some
cases, being an incumbent party can be a disadvantage as well. In cases where incumbent parties were
responsible for human rights abuses or seen as exclusionary to certain segments of the population,
voters may want a change and support movements or parties that cater more specifically to them, or
whom they do not have grievances against due to past state-sponsored violence. It should be noted,
however, that guerilla parties were also responsible for violence and some human rights abuses during
these conflicts as well and that may alienate voters.
There are four main components of change that political parties typically address to alter party
structure and party attitude after a conflict, including two main structural changes and two main
attitudinal changes. The two main structural changes are the demobilization of the organizational
structure and development of party organization. In addition, attitudinal changes are required, which
include democratization of decision-making and adaptation of party strategies and goals (de Zeeuw
2008). The extent to which parties must make these changes is dependent on the parties’ origins. For
example, guerilla movements that were just becoming recognized as political parties, such as the FMLN
and Renamo, had to do more to build their political structures than parties that were already
established and recognized as political parties by the civilian population, such as Frelimo in
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Mozambique. Party structure and attitude changes can be difficult to achieve, even if some specific
changes are outlined in negotiated peace agreements. Roadblocks to such change exist for political
parties just as they do for the entire system as it shifts to democracy. Concerns about a return to
violence, ingrained political processes, and lack of governing experience in a democratic system can
impede the parties’ willingness to alter their operations. The adherence of incumbent parties and
guerilla parties to the rules outlined by newly established democratic governments is a key aspect in
success of the transition process.
Demobilization
Demobilization efforts constitute one of the most important structural changes in the post conflict
period. The demobilization period is often referred to as DDR or demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration. The DDR process is usually integrated into the cease fire and peace agreement process.
Demobilization is “the process of significantly reducing the number of personnel under arms and in
military command structures” (Kingma 2002, 182). The reintegration portion of the DDR process refers
to efforts to re-settle ex-combatants into life after conflict (Kingma 2002). External actors, in these
cases especially the United Nations, often are the catalyst for delivering cease-fire agreements to end
the violence and help to implement DDR agreements; however, DDR agreements should not be seen as
a magic bullet (Muggah 2005). One of the main concerns as countries implement DDR efforts is that
there are often few opportunities for ex-combatants to establish new livelihoods (Kingma 2002). While
demobilization efforts are undoubtedly important in the transition period, concerns (including large
amounts of arms in civilian hands, their familiarity with the use of arms, the willingness of party
members to use arms and a lack of effort on the part of political parties to re-integrate combatants into
society) all serve as factors that discourage DDR (Garibay 2007; Kingma 2002; Muggah 2005).
Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique each had their own struggles with DDR in the transition
period. These conflicts were extremely violent, so DDR was an essential structural change in altering the
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political landscape and providing the basis for a democratic transition. When conflict is present for so
long, as in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, not only ex-combatants, but the countries
themselves are transformed by the experience (Kingma 2002). The history of violence in these countries
and years of war is a major factor as the former adversaries transition from combatants to participants
in a democracy. In countries with little to no democratic experience, parties that have recently emerged
from conflict are in a delicate state that can easily revert back to violence (de Zeeuw and Kumar 2006).
Both government and rebel groups in these conflicts used violence and coercion against civilians, and
the long term, widespread bloodshed can create a legacy of violence that can be difficult to overcome
(Allison 2010). This history of violence makes DDR an essential component of the adjustment in the
transition period.
Guided by the UN-led peace agreement, the main parties to El Salvador’s war, ARENA and the
FMLN, both struggled to disarm. ARENA, the government party supported by the military and the
United States, demobilized over 30,000 soldiers and essentially, “had to cut the number of soldiers in
the army by half, disband the anti-insurrectional battalions” and place police forces under civilian
authority to abide by the peace agreement and create a newly structured military (Garibay 2007, 468).
ARENA spoke out against the restructuring of the police force, desiring to preserve the forces’ privileges
and prerogative. The police force was essentially part of the military during the conflict and carried out
human rights abuses against Salvadoran citizens (Costa 2001). However, ARENA relented on its desire to
preserve the police force as it was as the FMLN insisted upon public security reform in order to agree to
demobilization (Costa 2001; Montgomery 1995). In addition to reform of the police force, the UN
Observer Mission in El Salvador, or ONUSAL, also sought to bring reform to the armed forces. One of
the first parts of the peace process was to disarm the government’s Civil Defense Units and reduce
forces. Additionally, ONUSAL’s Ad Hoc Commission recommended that more than 100 officers be
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dismissed following a review of their performance and those in the highest ranks of the military were
purged (Montgomery 1995; Stanley 2006).
The FMLN, the guerilla party, had its own different goals to meet under the demobilization
agreement, which included turning over their weapons and demobilizing according to a calendar
schedule outlined in the peace agreement. The FMLN did not meet disarmament requirements on time
and in May 1993, officials discovered an illegal arms cache in Nicaragua maintained by the FMLN. The
party also continued to maintain weapons in El Salvador. This discovery put the FMLN in violation of the
Peace Accords. Following the discovery, a date was set for the FMLN to report its arms caches and
destroy them by August 4, 1993. The party completed the process of disarmament to the satisfaction of
the UN mission by August 18, 1993 and incurred some grumblings about being able to maintain political
party status despite violating the Peace Accords (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador 2003).
In addition to disarming, reintegration of combatants after the conflict remained an important task
in El Salvador. ARENA’s reintegration plan for former soldiers was practically non-existent. Some of the
soldiers from the ARENA side were reintegrated into the army or newly developed civilian police force.
Others who were not integrated into new forces held demonstrations in 1994 and 1995 to demand
better programs. The demonstrations were repressed and those participating were compared to the
guerilla forces that had risen up against the government during the war (Garibay 2007).
The UN’s reintegration programs for FMLN combatants included a land transfer program, which
resulted in the transfer of about 10 percent of the country’s rural land to former combatants and was
essentially a program that offered “land for arms” (Whitfield 2001, 37). The land distribution program in
El Salvador was originally devised in 1980 in a plan where 20 percent of arable lands were to be
transferred to a similar portion of the population. The 1992 accords reiterated to the government the
importance of land distribution, but it wasn’t until 1994 that there was a focus on distributing the
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excedentes 5 (Kowalchuk 2003). The FMLN provided more assistance with reintegration than ARENA,
and nearly all of the combatants from this side of the conflict were eligible for some type of
reintegration program (Garibay 2007). Both parties, however, broke promises in the re-integration
process and many ex-combatants have become worse off following the conflict. One former guerilla
stated, “‘Right now we’re worse off than we were during the war, we have nothing, no houses, no land,
no work’” (Carr 1994, 13). The ONUSAL mission in El Salvador cost a total of $107.7 million dollars (U.S.)
(United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador 2003).
Mozambique’s DDR process was headed by the United Nations Observation Mission in Mozambique
(UNMOZ) after the civil war ended in with the signing of the General Peace Accord (GPA) in 1992.
UNMOZ spent a total of $486.7 million dollars (U.S.) in Mozambique, with a $95 million of those funds
going to finance demobilization on both sides (United Nations Operation in Mozambique 2001; Alden
2002). Mozambique’s peace process and DDR component did put a stop to the civil war, but the
agreement failed to fully define how demobilization and its disarmament component were to be carried
out. The large number of weapons distributed during the course of the war, which Interpol estimated at
1.5 million AK-47s in 1995, the failure to significantly reduce the number of arms, and the accusation
that both Frelimo and Renamo hid weapons and were guilty of other types of non-compliance led to
difficulties in the process. To deal with this problem, UNMOZ set up a Cease-Fire Commission (CFC)
whose main objective was to find undeclared weapons depots and caches throughout the country.
Time constraints in the UNMOZ mandate and the failure of the UN to properly destroy scores of the
weapons left many unaccounted for weapons in Mozambique which boosted the arms trade in southern
Africa (Vines 1998).
In addition to reducing the number of weapons circulating in the country, demobilizing combatants
was also of great importance. In total, there were over 90,000 soldiers and guerillas involved in
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Mozambique’s civil war. Under UNMOZ, both sides were to begin demobilizing troops in January 1994
and a new army was developed called the Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique, or FADM,
consisting of 30,000 members from both Frelimo and Renamo. Special police units such as the Lightning
Battalion were also formed to curb banditry (Vines 1998; Weinstein 2002). In 1994, immediately after
the conflict ended, approximately 16,000 troops had been demobilized (with 76,000 soldiers
demobilized by the eve of the first election later that year) and were taking advantage of reintegration
programs such as the Information and Referral Service (IRS) which helped to provide counseling and
guidance to demobilized soldiers (Alden 2002; United Nations Operation in Mozambique 2001).
Reintegration is a difficult process for combatants from both sides of a conflict, but Renamo’s
background as primarily military men led to many difficulties for members to reintegrate in the DDR
period. Renamo lacked qualified members, meaning those with formal education, past governing and
electoral experience, to lead in the transition to a political party (Manning 2007). DDR efforts changed
the geographical location of party members through the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) in which
combatants were sent back to their homes and provided with training and short-term pay. This effort,
which was meant to ease ex-combatant movement back into society, accounted for more than fifty
percent of the disarmament and reintegration funds spent in Mozambique. The RRS action did lead to a
disruption of Renamo’s tightly-organized and hierarchical military operation (Levine 2007). The
interference in Renamo’s structure hurt it as a political party and the party faced reduced opportunities
to appeal to citizens outside of its traditional strongholds. Meanwhile, Frelimo has easily continued to
maintain its influence over Mozambique’s capital, Maputo, and less geographical disruption in Frelimo’s
membership, coupled with its already existing influence and resources as the incumbent, has helped
Frelimo to win in elections and sustain control of the government (deTollenaere 2006).
As in El Salvador and Mozambique, Cambodia’s DDR period came after the peace agreement and
was mainly led by the UN Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which was created during the
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Paris Peace Accords, signed in 1991. The UN spent more on UNTAC than on the programs in El Salvador
and Mozambique, with total expenditures reaching $1.6 billion dollars U.S. (United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia 2003). The reason for this is that there were many items that went into satisfying
Cambodia’s demobilization effort outlined in the Accords. The agreement called for demobilizing of 70
percent of the armed forces of Cambodia’s main political parties, which equaled roughly 200,000 troops
and 250,000 militia members (Amer 1993). In addition to demobilizing troops, the agreement called for
locating and confiscating arms caches, conducting a nation-wide mine clearing operation, supervising
and regrouping Cambodian armed forces, supervising arms storage of the forces in cantonment sites,
and stopping outside weapons, ammunition and military equipment contributions (Ratner 1993; Frost
1991). The Cambodian peace agreement also called for all Vietnamese troops to leave Cambodia with
their equipment and lastly, POWs were to be released under the agreement laid out in the Paris Peace
Accords (Ratner 1993).
During the back-and-forth and complex peace talks to end the Cambodian conflict, King Sihanouk
and Hun Sen announced on June 5, 1991 that their respective parties would discontinue receipt of
foreign military aid and encouraged other Cambodian parties to follow this step (Frost 1991). Though
the two sides came to an agreement on the importation of arms, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the
agreement and continued to import tanks into the country while simultaneously organizing in the jungle
and rural areas (Than 1991). At the end of the conflict, the UNTAC began assisting with the reduction of
weapons and other transitional tasks.
One of the first tasks of UNTAC was enforcing demobilization of troops on both sides. According to
the CPP, it was held accountable by UNTAC, while the guerilla parties had the advantage of being in
good with UNTAC due to widely held negative perceptions of the CPP in the West. The CPP claimed that
UNTAC was biased against the party in its guidelines on troop cantonment and weapons impoundment
during the DDR period, leading it to lose territory to well-armed resistance forces in 1993 and 1994
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(Kevin 2000). Even so, the CPP-run Cambodian government, supported by Vietnam throughout the civil
conflict, maintained its stronghold over the bureaucracy and the military, therefore continuing the
ability to exercise control by violent force if necessary, even after the demilitarization period. There is
also evidence that during the period many Vietnamese troops returned to Cambodia (Than 1991).
FUNCINPEC also built up arms during the years before the 1997 violence in Cambodia broke out as
Prince Ranariddh sought advice from anti-communist military advisers (Kevin 2000). Although the 1997
coup will be explained in further detail in a later section, the fact that it happened shows that there
were still enough weapons in Cambodia after demobilization for warring factions to be able to take up
arms against each another once again.
Each of the three cases has experienced violence following the wars, despite demobilization efforts.
In El Salvador, since the end of the war there has been a rise in the number of young people joining
gangs, or maras (Garibay 2007; Garland 2004). The increase in gang participation, coupled with a high
murder rate, “contributes to maintaining a high level of violence and delinquency and therefore a very
strong feeling of insecurity among the people” (Garibay 2007, 476). Additionally, human rights abuses
by the reorganized National Civilian Police force are unchecked and suspicions have arisen of police
involvement in social cleansing, especially of gang members. The lack of monitoring investigations of
these allegations, and limited ability to prosecute military and security forces for past crimes due to the
1992 amnesty law, have caused these allegations to go unrestricted and unpunished (Holiday 2010).
In Mozambique the lack of effective disarmament has led to many civilians maintaining arms and an
increase in arms being trafficked into South Africa (Vines 1998). Additionally, Mozambican police
statistics have shown yearly increases in armed crimes and there has been a boost in crime in the capital
city of Maputo with increases in banditry and robbery (Vines 1998; Kingma 2002). Mozambicans have
held onto their weapons to maintain personal security. One man involved in crime activity was quoted
as saying,
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What is there for people like me to do? A gun gives me a job! My family struggle on the land and
they can’t feed me. I need to help them. The police use guns all the time to make money. So can I!
Everything around here is about money. Eh, without it you have nothing. So I make money with a
gun (Vines 1998, 199).
This quotation highlights a dilemma that many people are faced with after a conflict. Despite
demobilization and reintegration efforts, many people, especially former military men, find that they
can provide a better living for their families through criminal activities with easy access to arms and little
economic opportunity. Another factor that may have influenced civilian reluctance to give up their
weapons following the war was the historic brutality of the Portuguese and later the Mozambican police
force. The 1992 peace agreement outlined steps for reforming the Police of the Republic of
Mozambique (PRM), but with little UN civilian police oversight, poor training and lack of equipment the
PRM were ill-prepared to handle public security. The PRM has been known for continued brutality in
the post-war period, especially against journalists, undermining the democratic idea of an open public
sphere to assess corrupt government institutions (Seleti 2000).
In Cambodia, some groups such as the Khmer Rouge and in turn the State of Cambodia (SOC),
refused to disarm after the UN intervention (Chandler 2008). Violence continued to escalate in the
country from 1992 through 1993. Over two hundred people were victims of political assassinations
ordered by the CPP-run Cambodian government after the Khmer Rouge massacred Vietnamese civilians,
(all while the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was still in the country) (Chandler
2008). In 1997, a coup de force was perpetrated by the CCP. The coup occurred after mounting
tensions between FUNCINPEC and the CPP developed in the power-sharing agreement that afforded
Cambodia a unique, two-prime minister system. Hun Sen was concerned that Ranariddh was plotting to
unseat the CPP from power. Several violent clashes broke out between FUNCIPEC and the CPP in
Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Battambang in the first half of 1997. Over the weekend of July 5th and 6th
in 1997 a war was waged in Phnom Penh between the two parties that left Ranariddh in exile in
Bangkok, Thailand, returning to Cambodia in 1998 as the international community pressed for an
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election (Kevin 2000). During the coup, over a hundred members of the FUNCINPEC were reported as
killed or tortured (Chandler 2008). Though there is speculation still as to which party struck first, the
international community, and specifically the West, accepted Ranariddh’s assertion that it was Hun Sen
who started the violence with the coup (Kevin 2000).
As the CPP has consolidated power in Cambodia since the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991, Hun Sen
has met critics and opposition with increasing force, often initiating retaliatory and preemptive strikes
against political opponents (Heder 2011). Cambodia’s security forces are highly politicized with little
defense from abuse by either state or nonstate actors due to weaknesses in the court system and the
established culture of impunity. It is also reported that detainees are routinely tortured by police and
security forces are known to carry out extrajudicial killings against political opponents and activists
(McCargo 2010). Demobilization didn’t help Cambodia to drastically reduce arms as planned. The
country now has a bustling weapons trade, even reaching into the tourism industry. Western legal
experts and human rights workers say problems with applying the rule of law allows Cambodian citizens
to easily arm. According to one human rights worker, “There are probably more guns now than there
were when the UN left in 1993. Almost everybody has a gun" (Cohen 1997, 6). Additionally, drug
trafficking and human trafficking have become the two biggest organized crime problems in the
Cambodia. Local authorities in Cambodia are reluctant to come down on human trafficking for the sex
trade because cheap sex boosts the country’s tourism industry and several Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) in Cambodia report that many Cambodian authorities are directly involved in the
sex trade or benefit from it (Finckenauer and Chin 2004).
Therefore, though the UN spent massive amounts of money on demobilization efforts in each of
these countries, the arms trade, police violence and crime are still major concerns for El Salvador,
Cambodia and Mozambique. While UN intervention was successful in each of these countries in that,
except for a short relapse in Cambodia in 1997, they have not returned to war, there remains evidence
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of continued and growing criminal activity in all three. In each country, the weak rule of law is
associated with the failure of these countries to regulate illegal activity and hold criminals and state
agents responsible for their actions. In addition, all parties have attempted to circumvent the
demobilization process in one way or another.
Development of Party Organization and Democratization of Decision-Making
Besides demobilization, the development of party organization is an important task in the postconflict period, especially for guerilla parties. In Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique, guerilla
parties tried to develop political organizations to replace previous military organizations, while
incumbent parties, all of which had political organizations in place, adjusted to the new political climate.
Making attitudinal and structural adjustments in the post-conflict provides added challenges in the
transition period. While structural changes are often established and implemented or at least
influenced by peace agreements and external actors, changes in citizen and party attitude must come
internally (Diamond 1999). Democratization of decision-making is one of the most difficult aspects of
transformation, as both incumbent and guerilla parties during conflict possess an entrenched
hierarchical, military structure. According to de Zeeuw, adaptation of strategies and goals is essential to
long-term survival as parties work on “designing political campaigns for support in popular elections,
building relationships with civil society organizations, and perhaps most difficult, communicating with
opposition parties in nonviolent ways” (de Zeeuw 2008, 15). These changes, as with structural changes,
are often more difficult for former rebel groups as they work to adjust with new rules in place following
peace agreements and in some cases, reduced resources. Though former rebel parties face many more
challenges, some establishment parties may also go through attitudinal changes in the period following
civil conflict (de Zeeuw 2008).
Democratization of decision-making inside parties is a complex and difficult part of the
transition process that encompasses tapping party leaders and navigating intra-party or intra-elite
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relations. Though this is seen as an attitude change, democratization of decision-making also requires
structural change in reporting structures within the parties. A change in reporting structure means that
power will become less centralized in one party figure or group if the party is actively democratizing its
decision-making. Intra-elite relations, or relations between party leaders, may become problematic
when the time comes to decide on party leadership and structure. Bringing in new blood to help with
the party’s transition often causes turmoil between the original party leaders and those viewed as new,
less seasoned party participants or between those who stayed and fought versus those who were in
exile during the war (Manning 2007).
Despite having to make some changes to adhere to the demilitarization criteria outlined in the
1992 peace agreement, ARENA maintained strong support in elections following the conflict and easily
won the first presidential election in 1994 (de Zeeuw 2010). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the UN body
overseeing the 1994 elections deemed them to be free and fair (Montgomery 1995). In addition to
controlling the executive branch, ARENA was able to develop a congressional coalition with El Salvador’s
PCN party in parliament to obtain the majority in the legislative branch as well (de Zeeuw 2010).
Despite ARENA’s the role as an establishment party, it still needed to make some adjustments to
maintain political control as its members laid down arms. In the first election after the war, ARENA
established a campaign that was wrought with images of the war, emphasizing the destruction caused
by the FMLN, in a campaign that many thought inspired fear in voters (Wantchekon 1999). These
political advertisements, coupled with ARENA’s standing as the incumbent party, helped it to shore up
voters in several election cycles following the conflict. ARENA won the presidency in four consecutive
elections and their numbers in the legislature have remained fairly steady. While the 2009 election was
a big loss for ARENA, the continuing election of ARENA candidates to legislative seats shows that the
party persists in having a strong presence in the Salvadoran government.
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ARENA is maintained by the country’s economic elite (Garibay 2007). As discussed in Chapter 3,
the party was created as a counterinsurgency to the FMLN by army commander Roberto D’Aubuisson in
1980. The party began as death squads funded by El Salvador’s elite families who were concerned that
they needed to combat the FMLN to prevent erosion of their privilege (Wolf 2009). As a military
organization supported by the Salvadoran government, the bulk of ARENA’s decision-making during the
conflict was centralized with the country’s elites and military leaders. Since the end of the conflict and
the transition to a civilian police force, ARENA’s power has been transitioned out of the hands of military
officials, in accord with the 1992 peace agreement. In the years since the conflict, decision-making and
power has been wielded mainly by a new elite of entrepreneurs, merchants and especially financiers.
This has led some of the landowners (the old elite group) to feel marginalized by the party (Garibay
2007). The distinction between old and new elite is not rigid and elites old or new certainly continue to
support ARENA against the FMLN. Many analysts attributed ARENA’s 2009 defeat in the presidential
election, to the increasing centralization of power in the party’s structure (Holiday 2010). Much of the
party’s power has become concentrated in globalized economic power groups (EPGs), a new group of
elites, with business interests in agricultural, commercial, and service enterprises, which control ARENA
by contributing money to its candidates, lobbying for laws and rules that will benefit their interests, and
using media alliances to preserve elite dominance (Wolf 2009).
In Mozambique, Frelimo, as the establishment party, has continued to maintain a stronghold,
with power concentrated in the south, particularly in the capital of Maputo. With a party history that
dates back to its overthrow of Mozambique’s colonial ruler, Frelimo has been aided by its old foe,
Portugal as well as a strong centralization of power win elections (Weinstein 2002). Such unity was not
always characteristic of Frelimo. Following the conflict with Renamo, Frelimo experienced vicious infighting within the party and many were purged from Frelimo’s ranks during this period (Sumich 2010).
Those in Frelimo who emerged victorious from this period remained unified and according to Sumich
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“the top ranks of the leadership have historically been dominated by small colonial elite of southern,
urban/peri-urban assimilados, with prominent members from racial minorities” (Sumich 2010, 683).

6

With the unity of Frelimo’s ruling elite, little room has been left for democratizing the party’s decisionmaking.
Joaquim Chissano, the incumbent president who succeeded Samora Machel to become
president in 1986, was re-elected twice in 1994 and 1999. Chissano came to power following the death
in a plane crash in 1986 of Frelimo’s charismatic leader, Samora Machel, who was president of
Mozambique from 1975-1986. As with Hun Sen, Chissano acted as a leader during the war and had
staying power in the transition period. While there is a strong centralization of power within Frelimo, no
single leader personifies the party in the same way that Dhlakama does for Renamo. Frelimo party
leaders selected Armando Guebuza in 2002 as the presidential candidate in the 2004 race as Chissano
chose not to continue. Chissano was involved in naming his successor, but did not simply appoint
Guebuza alone (due to a long-standing feud between the two, Guebuza probably wouldn’t have been
selected if it were only up to Chissano) (Carbone 2005; Africa Confidential 2006). This shows that
despite Chissano’s undoubted power in Frelimo, the party did in fact take into account its institutional
procedures in naming Guebuza, though the selection process was still exclusive (Carbone 2005).
In Cambodia, the CPP has increasingly shored up its power and control since the end of the war.
According to Duncan McCargo, “the CPP is consolidating its authoritarianism, while average Cambodians
remain stripped of a sense of citizenship and participation in the governing of their country” (McCargo
2010). Though in 1993 when the power-sharing agreement was reached it was mutually beneficial to
both the CPP and FUNCINPEC for different reasons, the CPP maintained nearly complete control of the
Cambodian bureaucracy, as well as a major portion of the country’s military and police, even though
FUNCINPEC had won a majority of votes in the election at that time (Curtis 1998). Over the years,
6

Assmiliados refers to those Mozambican subjects of mixed race in the colonial period who met Portuguese
standards of “civilization” (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983).
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FUNCINPEC and other parties that were previously competitors, such as the Sam Rainsy party, lost their
foothold while the CPP with Hun Sen as prime minister has continued to grow in power.
Since the coup of 1997, Hun Sen and the CPP’s maintenance of power has been unwavering.
Within the CPP itself, power is centralized with Hun Sen and his persona is almost inseparable from the
party. As discussed in Chapter 3, some observer groups have deemed Cambodian elections to be free
and fair, while others have expressed disagreement with this finding. Even if the elections were free
and fair, the entrenchment of the CPP’s power became so deep after the coup, that other parties have
had difficulties in making electoral strides. The CPP takes credit as the party that kept Cambodia afloat
when the rest of the world was hostile and indifferent and this has helped to solidify its popular support
and legitimacy in Cambodia’s transition period (Kevin 2000).
Compared to incumbent parties, revolutionary or insurgency parties in the conflicts in El
Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique have had to make more comprehensive adjustments as they
transitioned to peace-time political parties. According to Michael Allison, following the conflict, “rebel
groups confront obstacles similar to those confronting any new political party. For example, they need
to devise a political platform, raise money in order to cover the costs of full-time staff, advertising and
campaign materials, and select leaders and candidates” (Allison 2010, 105). After the end of a war,
former rebel groups must often consolidate into one entity and this can be difficult if, as was the case
for the FMLN, control was dispersed among various regions and leaders throughout the conflict. The
FMLN encompassed multiple groups that were created in different parts of the country and possessed
various ideological differences. The party had to try to adapt and evolve into one entity to work as a
distinct political party following the conflict (Manning 2007). Similarly, in Cambodia, the opposition had
to unite during the transition process, but it could be said that this was even more difficult in this
circumstance as the opposition was split and at odds during the war. In El Salvador, unable to
participate as a political party in elections prior to the peace agreement, the FMLN was comprised
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primarily of military structures following the conflict, though they also had a political wing that was less
developed. As a result of focusing primarily on military function, the FMLN faced a shortage of staff
trained and experienced in governance and party administration (de Zeeuw 2010). This was a problem
also shared by other revolutionary or insurgency parties, including Renamo, FUNCINPEC, and the Khmer
Rouge.
An internal power fight, along with the FMLN’s need to grow from primarily a military
organization into a political party, caused the party to struggle as it aspired to build itself into a political
party with clout (de Zeeuw 2010). Part of this success is due to the fact that following the war, in the
1994 and 1999 elections, the FMLN mostly only had geographic support from areas that had been hit
with wartime violence. However, in the 2004 elections, the FMLN saw increased support in larger cities
and metropolitan areas (Azpuru 2010). As the FMLN developed into a political organization, the party
continued to wrestle with division over ideology and tactics and two factions emerged, the reformists
and the orthodox divisions (Ward 2008). According to Manning, the need to consolidate into a single
party “made it necessary for its leaders to devise formal rules for leadership selection, though these
remained top down and were not always executed in a transparent manner” (Manning 2007, 265).
Though internal problems persist (the reformists lean towards a democratic party structure and
practical vision while the orthodox side desires to remain true to the revolutionary movement and
prefers a more centralized party organization) the party has continued as one, increasing its control of
legislative seats and winning the executive branch in 2009 (Ward 2008).
Many parties have steady, identifiable leaders and the FMLN is no different, but their history of
running different candidates in presidential elections shows that power is not centralized in the hand of
one person. Additionally, the FMLN has also worked successfully to spread the party’s power by
winning a number of legislative seats, mayoral positions and municipal elections (Wade 2008). The
FMLN eventually achieved success by adapting. In 1994, 1999 and 2004 presidential elections, the
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FMLN ran candidates that were guerillas during the war. Rubén Zamora served as the 1994 presidential
candidate, with Facundo Guardado (a reformist candidate) running in 1999, and Schafik Handel (a
former FMLN commander and general coordinator after the war) in 2004 (Holiday 2010; Wade 2008).
All three candidates lost their elections. Picking a presidential candidate from outside of the existing
party structure seemed to be the path to victory for the FMLN, with Mauricio Funes winning the 2009
presidential election. Funes was a popular newscaster, whose role as a non-guerilla candidate and
promise of moderate governing made him a more appealing candidate to many voters (Holiday 2010).
Therefore, ARENA’s domination of the political arena was not disrupted for four elections until Funes’
victory in the 2009 election. FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes became El Salvador’s president at a time
when a noticeable shift could be glimpsed in Latin American politics, with several countries electing
leaders from the left. Thus, the region’s political climate could also be pointed to as a reason for his
victory.
Renamo has faced comparable struggles to the FMLN and FUNCINPEC in trying to restructure
from a guerilla movement to a political party. One of the party’s primary goals was to make itself into a
legitimate political organization, rather than be seen as a puppet of South Africa and Rhodesia as it had
often been characterized during the war (Manning 2004). After the end of the armed struggle and
following the 1994 elections, Renamo experienced problems developing politically due to organizational
weaknesses stemming from leader Afonso Dhlakama’s resistance to institutionalization and minimal
organization (Manning 2008; de Tollenaere 2006). Dhlakama preferred to keep Renamo’s power
centralized in him and focus on dissatisfaction with Frelimo to try and appeal to voters (Manning 2010).
This has allowed Frelimo to consolidate power and as with FUNCINPEC, Renamo has struggled to
achieve any type of popular support. A party comprised of mostly military men, in the new political
context Renamo faced challenges in fronting appealing electoral candidates and changing from a
centralized party structure to one with more widespread roots across the country. Since the late 1970s,
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power has been centralized in the hands of Dhlakama, who is not personally popular or charismatic, and
there is rarely a party decision made by any member other than Dhlakama (Manning 2008). According
to Lemon, Dhlakama “runs Renamo in a personalized way, dismissing those capable of creating a party
machine through fear that they might challenge him and so creating no effective mobilization
structures” (Lemon 2007). This continued centralization, even after failing to make electoral gains and
consolidate influence in Mozambique, shows how difficult it is to alter existing political party structure in
a general sense (de Tollenaere 2006). It could be argued that Renamo has not made a concerted effort
to reform internally and its real problem is that it has not adapted its strategy to appeal to and reach
new voters, thus continuing to struggle in the polls. Mozambique’s political situation is ripe for a new
opposition party to emerge, with Renamo faring poorly in elections.
Renamo and the CPP are examples of parties that have not democratized decision-making in the
post-conflict period as Hun Sen of the CPP and Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo have remained the leaders
of their parties since the end of each of their country’s conflicts (McCargo 2010; Manning 2008). The
CPP and Renamo cases are exceptional in that as intra-party relations develop following conflict, a
party’s dominant wartime coalition will usually strive to maintain authority of the party (Manning 2004).
This tendency can create complex power-struggles within parties following conflict. According to
Manning “because electoral politics require a different set of skills than those demanded in wartime, a
transition from military confrontation may change the sources of organizational power and authority”
(Manning 2004, 59). The CPP and Renamo are exceptional because they refused to make this change.
As the insurgent party, the refusal to change has hindered Renamo’s viability. The CPP, on the other
hand, is only able to hold on to power because of the advantages of incumbency and a willingness to
bend the rules to stay in power.
FUNCINPEC in Cambodia similarly struggled to transition from structures that were primarily
militaristic to an organization that was more politically based (de Zeeuw 2010). As the Cambodian
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government and power-sharing agreement were established in 1993, FUNCINPEC promised peace and a
return to Cambodia’s Golden Age. FUNCINPEC as a party with a royalist heritage has an inherent leaning
toward centralization of power, with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of Cambodia’s King Norodom
Sihanouk, serving as the party’s central figure (Un and Ledgerwood 2003). FUNCINPEC relied heavily on
the traditional image of Sihanouk the god-king and evoked the past in an attempt to appeal to the
Cambodian citizenry. Though in 1993 when the power-sharing coalition was established, the
Cambodian people were certainly more familiar with the CPP due to the party’s previous years of
governing Cambodia, it should be noted that neither party had much of a political background or claim
to past good governance (Curtis 1998). Cambodian citizens were naturally also familiar with Sihanouk as
a traditional ruler, but the FUNCINPEC party was a new development in the political spectrum. In
addition to being less widely known than the CPP, FUNCINPEC struggled with shoring up support beyond
Phnom Penh and faced internal strife with the party splitting into as many as eight factions, which did
not come together as the FMLN did in El Salvador (Curtis 1998; de Zeeuw 2010). FUNCINPEC also made
a mistake in ignoring large parts of the countryside. Prince Norodom Ranariddh stated in 1998 that lack
of attention to FUNCINPEC’s rural networks after the establishment of the power sharing coalition was
the party’s biggest mistake (Hughes 2002). All this, and the lack of a clear direction, caused FUNCIPEC to
lose goodwill among Cambodians (Roberts 2002).
FUNCINPEC’s power and that of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), an offshoot of FUNCINPEC, have
seen continuous decline as the CPP has solidified its hold on control over politics in Cambodia (McCargo
2010). The SRP, and specifically the party leader Sam Rainsy, have faced legal action at the hands of the
CPP meant to cripple the party’s organization. Sam Rainsy was forced into exile from 2004-2006 in
connection with his supposed involvement over Vietnamese infringement into Cambodian territory
(Heder 2010). Additionally, according to Heder, other SRP party members “were either in detention,
convicted of crimes that meant they could not stand for election, or under threat of politically motivated
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prosecution” (Heder 2010, 212). As a result, the SRP remains a mainly urban party that has been
unable to consolidate rural support (McCargo 2010). FUNCINPEC and the SRP have struggled to gain a
foothold with voters in Cambodia. Though Ranariddh maintained a presence in FUNCINPEC through
2006, splintering within the party and lack of electoral success after 1993 led to a reduction in power for
the party. Ranariddh was replaced by Keo Puth Rasmey, the son-in-law of former Cambodian King
Norodom Sihanouk, and the Prince created the Norodom Ranariddh Party, which has been unsuccessful
in gaining momentum and winning elections (Weggel 2007). The names alone of some of Cambodia’s
political parties, including the Sam Rainsy Party and the Norodom Ranariddh Party, hint at the history of
party personalization and centralization of power in the organizations. Ultimately, however, the
personalization has not worked and the parties that recognize this have been more successful at the
polls. Therefore, the post-conflict period constitutes an important phase for parties to adapt in an effort
to gain or maintain control as the country transitions. The parties that have refused to change
(particularly the insurgent parties) have fared poorly at the polls.
Adaptation of Strategies and Goals
Adapting strategies and goals to gain followers is another important piece for political parties to
address in the transition period. Some parties feel pressure to reshape their collective incentive
strategies, which refers to the way parties seek to attract a mass following (Manning 2004). Not all have
to change their strategies and goals to attract a following; all of the incumbent parties in the three cases
already had a mass following at the end of the war. For new political parties, such as the rebel parties in
each of these conflicts that emerged as political organizations, adaptation of strategies and goals is an
important component for advancing political power through the winning of elections. Already existing
parties may not have to perform a complete overhaul of their collective incentive strategies, but they
may have to tweak specific aspects of how they seek to appeal to followers, especially after long, bloody
conflicts where they perpetrated violent crimes against civilian populations.
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In El Salvador, the extreme polarization of the political climate following the conflict had many
Salvadorans firmly supporting either the FMLN or ARENA (Ryan 1997). As mentioned earlier, ARENA
was the winner of the 1994 elections, the first following the conflict. ARENA’s candidate, Armando
Calderón Sol won the presidency in a run-off. That election, ARENA won a plurality in the General
Assembly and the majority of the country’s mayoral positions (Montgomery 1995). The success of
ARENA in this race was puzzling to some as the party was seen as not on the popular side of the conflict.
El Salvador’s dominant party since 1985, ARENA received the majority of public campaign subsidies for
the 1994 elections and it is likely that its victory was aided by the party’s perceived ability to guarantee
stability in a war-weary country. The ARENA name, coupled with this strategy, allowed it to maintain its
following from the conflict and attract new voters in rural areas (Wantchekon 1999). As previously
noted, the FMLN’s collective incentive strategy for appealing to voters was to focus largely on the
municipal level following the resolution of the conflict. The FMLN has succeeded in appealing to
municipalities and success in these elections has helped the party to consolidate control in El Salvador’s
urban areas, including the capital city of San Salvador and gradually build success in the national arena
(Manning 2007).
In Mozambique, according to Manning, “the pattern of support for the two major parties
changed little across three postwar general elections” (Manning 2008, 54). Support for Renamo and
Frelimo has consistently come from the regional areas from which they drew their base of support
during the war: the central provinces and rural areas for Renamo and the south, extreme north, and
urban areas for Frelimo (Manning 2008). Renamo has consistently billed itself as the “coalition of the
marginalized” to try to appeal to voters who feel left out the political process by Frelimo. Renamo
hasn’t done much to alter its appeal to voters, also known as a collective incentive strategy (Manning
2004). Renamo has continued to use longstanding ethnoregional divisions in their appeal to voters,
criticizing Frelimo for purposely excluding the party and its members from the political process through
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actions such as altering election rules in ways that favor Frelimo (Manning 2004, 2008). Though Renamo
has some support in the rural provinces, Frelimo has made inroads, appealing to voters through
intensive campaigning, reorganization of party structures, and spending on infrastructure projects
(Lemon 2007; Manning 2008). Currently the president of Mozambique, Frelimo’s Armando Guebuza,
has many Frelimo supporters concerned that his policies may leave them out with favor shifting to new
social groups and regions, which has marginalized some Frelimo strongholds in the south and the capital
city of Maputo (Sumich 2010). Frelimo is doing this to gain new voters in the rural areas of the country,
thus focusing increased resources toward geographical regions that are typically supported by Renamo.
The Cambodian political parties FUNCINPEC and the CPP have also developed collective
incentive strategies in order to draw in support. As mentioned earlier, FUNCINPEC won the first election
in 1993, but still had to share power with CPP due to the power-sharing coalition created by the peace
agreement calling for two prime ministers. The CPP has worked to reduce the power of opposition
parties by exploiting internal divisions, filing lawsuits against electoral opponents that have spoken
against Hun Sen, such as Sam Rainsy, and using ties to Cambodia’s National Election Commission to the
party’s advantage. Additionally, the CPP possesses a large informal network of supporters who work to
win support of with heads of households in communes throughout Cambodia, which has been an
important part of adding to their voting bloc (McCargo 2010). Adapting strategies and goals in the postconflict period is an important component of parties’ efforts to gain voters. In Cambodia, El Salvador
and Mozambique, parties adapted strategies and goals to different degrees based on their party status
(incumbent or guerilla), leadership styles and political culture.
Conclusion
As this chapter illustrates, political parties are the main players in a country’s transition period.
While democratic forms of government can be promoted in a country, it is up to the internal actors,
especially traditional political parties, to adhere to and make the changes called for by peace
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agreements. In some cases, political parties make efforts to adjust their structures and attitudes in ways
that show they are striving to function legitimately in the democratic political arena. Some parties make
various alterations structurally and attitudinally, but without fundamentally altering the way they
functioned internally during the conflict, meaning the same party leaders are present and they are still
striving to exert control, but within the confines of the peacetime setting. Certain changes take more
effort and time to achieve. While demobilization is undoubtedly a long and complicated process,
definitive steps outlined in negotiated peace settlements make this a more objective, tangible change
than democratizing of party decision-making, for example. Some changes are easier to ascertain than
others and it is important to recognize that, as with the adoption of a democratic form of government,
changes do not occur overnight.
Examining party adjustments shows that ultimately, guerilla parties must do more to change
their structures following the conflict. Renamo, the FMLN and FUNCINPEC all had to work themselves
into the political arena having not been able to participate as political parties before the conflicts. While
incumbent parties also must change structurally by demilitarizing, their sustained ties to bureaucracy
and military structures following the conflict allow them an advantage in the post-conflict period. The
FMLN has undoubtedly been the most successful guerilla party out of the three examined in this study,
winning an impressive number of legislative seats and the executive branch in 2009. Renamo has
continued to struggle in elections in Mozambique, but has still managed to win seats in the legislature to
give the party some voice. FUNCINPEC has declined the most since the end of Cambodia’s conflict and is
no longer a competitive party, winning only two seats in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Renamo and
the FMLN both focused on geographical regions following their transitions to political parties, but while
the FMLN was able to parlay that into more national seats and electoral wins, Renamo has struggled to
establish itself as electorally competitive due to a lack of a clear strategy in appealing to new voters.
Renamo maintained its following in Mozambique’s central provinces, while the FMLN worked to gain
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local seats and a following in urban areas and war-exposed regions. FUNCINPEC’s failure to appeal to
rural voters, focusing mostly on a strategy that highlighted the party’s royalist roots, while the CPP
appealed to communes throughout Cambodia, has caused FUNCINPEC to become non-competitive over
the years. Additionally, Cambodia has seen more conflict between political parties following the
country’s war than El Salvador and Mozambique have seen between their political parties. While in El
Salvador and Mozambique there is undeniably animosity between the parties, Hun Sen’s CPP has done
more to undermine and oppress its political opponents than the other incumbent parties in this study.
The decline or reduced power of some parties has led to the sustained political dominance of
other parties. As mentioned previously, the CPP’s Hun Sen has maintained his role as Cambodia’s main
leader and has been in power since 1975. Similarly, Frelimo has yet to lose a presidential election in
Mozambique, but unlike the CPP, they have not had a one man rule, with Samora Machel as president
from 1975 to 1986, Joaquim Chissano acting as president from 1986 to 2004, and Armando Guebuza
winning for Frelimo following Chissano’s tenure. Are these countries sliding into electoral
authoritarianism? Are they going through the motions and elections of a traditional democracy, while
leadership remains solidly planted in the hands of one person or group? Some scholars, such as Sonja
Wolf, state that electoral authoritarian governments are emerging in the post-conflict period and she
believed this was happening in El Salvador in 2009 even with a change in power at the executive level. If
El Salvador is at risk, Mozambique and Cambodia are already there. El Salvador’s change in power at the
presidential level sets it apart from Cambodia and Mozambique in that regard, but as noted in previous
sections, all of these countries and the incumbent and guerilla parties have gone through changes in
party structure and attitude that have mirrored one another in important ways. Though political parties
are the main agents for promoting change in government in a transition period, it is important to
recognize that the transition does not happen in a vacuum and that parties do not always behave in
predictable ways.
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Chapter V: Analysis and Conclusions
The preceding chapters have provided a detailed overview of political party transitions amid a
democratic shift following a conflict period using three specific cases: Cambodia, El Salvador and
Mozambique. Identifying and examining specific cases and how they differ or mirror one another is an
important way to recognize what works and what doesn’t work in a successful transition. As more
countries throughout the world begin transitions to democracy, it is important to look to historical cases
to understand how these countries and their political parties can be successful in achieving democratic
transitions and consolidating democracies. Looking to historical cases allows us to determine the pitfalls
that arise during this crucial timeframe and how countries can move forward following what is often
prolonged and devastating violence.
It is vital to recognize that changes in a country’s political landscape do not happen in a vacuum.
Significant factors such as global political events (for example, waves of democracy and the end of the
Cold War) and regional political relationships (for example, Cambodia’s relationship with Vietnam and
the war in Vietnam) have an effect on the transition period and in some cases whether it comes about at
all. Additionally, external actors such as the UN, the United States, and regional players can play an
important role in determining the terms of peace agreements and their implementation. In each of the
cases in this study, the UN spent millions, and in the case of Cambodia, over a billion dollars, in bringing
missions to these countries with the purpose of seeing peace agreements put into operation (United
Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador 2003; United Nations Observation Mission in Mozambique
2001; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 2003). Aid and investment from external
sources can also play a role in affecting the success of a transition and adherence to peace agreements
(Manning 2010).
Overall, many factors go into a transition and determine whether or not it is successful.
Predicting the success or failure of a democratic transition is a complex issue on which a whole range of
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studies could be conducted. The purpose of this study is to determine which factors are important in
enabling warring parties in conflict settings to transition successfully as political parties in peacetime
settings. The study also provides definitions of democracy and determines whether the parties and
countries are functioning in a democratic fashion and if the appeal of democracy influences party
behavior. In addition, it assesses how external actors influence the internal actors and the transition
itself. Essentially, this thesis is a comparative case study of the political parties in El Salvador,
Mozambique, and Cambodia in the aftermath of war and during the countries’ transitions to democracy.
Its hypothesis is that democracy will be stronger where certain factors such as effective demilitarization
and reintegration, the implementation of a peace process, guidance from external actors, political party
cooperation and free and fair elections are present.
Successes and Failures in the Transition
One important factor for measuring the success of a transition is time, which gives us the ability
to assess electoral outcomes, political parties’ reactions to these outcomes and their interaction among
one another and with constituents. Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique have all been transitioning
to democracy since the early 1990s and provide nearly two decades in which the transition and political
party reactions can be observed. During the transition period, each of these cases has had some
amount of success with different aspects of the transition process (but not all to the same degree).
Some key factors have emerged as important in enabling parties to transition successfully in the postconflict period. These factors include: parties’ adaptation from military organizations to political
organizations, outreach to new groups of supporters and voters, maintenance of current groups of
supporters, development of a network within institutional structures and connections with a country’s
bureaucratic functions, and lastly, the political party’s appeal to voters. Winning elections in the postconflict period is of the utmost importance to parties, since winning electoral contests is the way to stay
in power within an emerging democratic framework. This is an obvious observation, but an important
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factor to be aware of in observing how political parties’ actions in the transition period are affected by
the desire to win elections. The successes and failures the political parties in these cases have
experienced are varied. Some successes have come about due to their hard work to legitimately win
elections in the new political atmosphere, while other party successes have been achieved through
illegitimate means, such as voter intimidation or doctoring laws to favor one party over another (Un and
Ledgerwood 2003; Lemon 2007; Heder 2011).
It is also important to factor in differences between insurgent and incumbent parties in
measuring success in party transition. Chapter 4 provided a comprehensive overview of how these
types of parties differ from one another in their actions and development in the post-conflict period.
Essentially, incumbent parties benefit from the advantages of incumbency including closer ties to a
country’s bureaucracy, and access to more funding in some cases, along with a recognized base of
voters and the political structure to build upon and expand outreach to new voters (de Zeeuw 2008).
Insurgent parties, on the other hand, experience a disadvantage in the post-conflict period because they
must restructure from military organizations to political organizations, often have less qualified political
leaders and untested electoral candidates and must develop a plan for reaching out to voters, despite
previous disqualifications from competing in elections (de Zeeuw 2008; Manning 2004; Manning 2007).
One important advantage for insurgent parties in the post-conflict period is that often voters are
disillusioned by the incumbent party, especially if they’ve experienced state-sponsored violence at its
hands. This advantage doesn’t necessarily lead to insurgent party success in elections though, as
demonstrated in the analysis in Chapter 3.
One important difference among these cases is organizational competence. For example, the
organizational competence of the FMLN, an insurgent party, made it a competitive contender in
elections, preventing ARENA from maintaining total control of the government. The FMLN started to
gain some control first by winning legislative seats at the national level (its number of legislative seats
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increased from 21 in 1994 to 35 in 2009). On the other hand, it has been noted throughout this study
that Renamo and FUNCINPEC have struggled in the post-conflict period to become viable electoral
contenders. Both parties have faced organizational issues such as too much centralization of leadership,
the failure to field educated and experienced candidates, the inability to gain new supporters and
infighting that the parties were not able to overcome (Manning 2008; de Tollenaere 2006; Curtis 1998;
de Zeeuw 2010). In Cambodia, other parties have emerged to challenge the incumbent CPP, such as the
Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), but that party too has struggled to make inroads in the country’s rural areas,
facing regulation from the CPP. It could be argued that the Cambodian people desire another option.
New political parties continue to be created, but the strong control of the CPP over governmental
processes and elections prevents any new party from breaking through. Perhaps this is also true in
Mozambique, as many citizens feel left out of the political process by Frelimo due to the ruling party’s
concentration in certain geographical areas, yet no alternative political party has posed a serious
challenge to Frelimo (Lemon 2007). In general, the FMLN has fared better than the other insurgent
parties examined in this study due to the party’s organizational competence following the war.
As many scholars note, democratic transition is not easy and there are many pitfalls that parties
face on the road to democratization, and not all parties necessarily promote democracy or see it in their
best interest. Scholars note that following the third wave of democracy, the transition to democracy
that many countries experienced from 1974 to the early 1990s, some backslid into authoritarianism.
Socioeconomic concerns such as high levels of poverty, weakness in democratic values, political
polarization, some political parties’ determination to maintain the status quo, and the inability to
restore or maintain the rule of law threaten democratic transitions. All of these problems are present in
these three cases, not to mention the threat of intervention by non-democratic foreign powers and the
collapse of surrounding democratic systems. These perils are all challenges to newly democratic
governments (Huntington 1991). How parties handle threats to democracy influences the success or
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failure of the transition. Determining threats and identifying traditional pitfalls in the present is also
crucial information for future democratic transitions.
In order to measure political parties’ effectiveness in the post-conflict period, one must
examine the successes and failures of each party and what these mean for the emerging democracy. Of
the three cases El Salvador has experienced the most success in the post-conflict period, particularly in
regards to the country’s elections, which for the most part have been considered free and fair (Holiday
2010). Navigating the alternation of power with no disruption in the system after the FMLN’s
presidential win in 2009 is another important factor pointing to El Salvador’s consolidating democracy
and the political parties’ commitment to maintaining the system. This is a remarkable achievement.
Though the country and individual political parties have seen successes on the electoral front, two
significant issues continue to plague El Salvador: poverty and violent crime. Since the end of the war in
1992 violent crime has been on the rise, especially with gang activity and narcotrafficking. The failure to
address these problems could pose the biggest challenge to El Salvador’s democratization in the postconflict period. Between 2000 and 2004 El Salvador saw 10,000 homicides and the number increased
to 16,000 between 2005 and 2009. The government’s inability to curb the violence can be attributed to
a number of shortfalls including weak rule of law, a weakened state in the post-conflict setting and a
corrupt relationship between the state and criminal organizations. The reduction in the size of the
police force after the signing of the peace accords and inadequate investment in capacity building of
institutions and personnel allows many criminals to remain unprosecuted and on the streets.
Additionally, the lack of legal repercussions for criminal activity actually incentivizes increased criminal
behavior (Richani 2010). There is no doubt that the increase in violent crime is an obstruction to El
Salvador’s democracy (Call 2003).
Poverty is a major concern in El Salvador and it is an issue in Mozambique and Cambodia as well.
As noted in Chapter 2, all of these countries have poor rankings on the Human Development Index,
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which is based on life expectancy, educational attainment and income (HDI Trends 2011). The inability
or failure to address the issue of poverty and foster economic development are obstacles to improving a
democracy (Huntington 1991). Scholars have long noted a strong correlation between economic
development and wealth with democratic longevity (Lipset 1981). With many citizens worse off after
the war in these countries (especially former combatants without a way to make a living) the advantages
of living in a democracy come into question. As quoted in the Chapter 2 literature review, Carlos M.
Vilas makes the connection between poverty and citizens questioning the benefits of democracy. Vilas’
observations note that poverty endangers the very concept of citizenship and excludes people from
access to basic services, which are essential components for meaningful political participation (Vilas
1996). Despite the poverty that still plagues El Salvador (42.5 percent of people were living at or below
the poverty line in 2010), the country has been able to move forward in improving its democracy, which
is evident in the peaceful transition of power at the executive level after years of ARENA rule (World
Bank 2012). Another promising sign of democracy in El Salvador includes better vertical accountability,
with increased political rights and more pluralism in the media (Holiday 2010).
Poverty and human development, along with economic growth rates serve as important factors
in predicting strength and longevity in democracy. As mentioned earlier, the HDI ranking is a
combination of life expectancy, educational attainment and income resulting in a number falling
between 0 and 1, with one being the highest score. To demonstrate where the cases fall on HDI scale,
the highest score in 2011 was Norway with an HDI of 0.943 and the Democratic Republic of Congo had
the lowest score in 2011 with 0.286. The scores are divided into a number of groups that characterize
the development in relation to the score including: very high human development, high human
development, medium human development and low human development. Of these cases, Cambodia
and El Salvador fell into the medium human development group with Mozambique falling into the low
human development group (United Nations Development Program, HDI Indices and Data 2011).
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Additionally, GDP per capita or PPP also helps to provide perspective on economic conditions in these
countries and on the standard of living for each country’s population. Table 5.6 below compares the
economic growth rate compared to human development measures and GDP per capita.
Table 5.6 A Comparison of Gross Domestic Product, Gross Domestic Product Per Capita and the
Human Development Index
Year
Cambodia
El Salvador
Mozambique

2000
2005
2009
2010
2011

GDP %
real
growth
rate
4.0%
13.4%
-1.5%
6.0%
6.1%

PPP (in
U.S.
dollars)

HDI

1,300
2,500
2,000
2,100
2,200

.438
.491
.513
.518
.523

GDP %
real
growth
rate
2.5%
2.8%
-3.5%
0.7%
1.4%

PPP (in
U.S.
dollars)

HDI

4,000
4,700
7,100
7,200
7,600

.619
.652
.669
.672
.674

GDP %
real
growth
rate
9.2%
7.5%
6.3%
7.0%
7.1%

PPP (in HDI
U.S.
dollars)
900
1,300
900
1,000
1,000

.245
.285
.312
.317
.322

Index Mundi. (2011). GDP Real Growth Rate Statistics for Cambodia. Retrieved from:
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=cb&v=66
Index Mundi. (2011). GDP Real Growth Rate Statistics for El Salvador. Retrieved from:
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=es&v=66
Index Mundi. (2011). GDP Real Growth Rate Statistics for Mozambique. Retrieved from:
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=es&v=66
Index Mundi. (2011). GDP Per Capita (PPP) Statistics for Mozambique. Retrieved from:
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=67&c=mz&l=en
Index Mundi. (2011). GDP Per Capita (PPP) Statistics for Cambodia. Retrieved from:
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=67&c=cb&l=en
Index Mundi. (2011). GDP Per Capita (PPP) Statistics for El Salvador. Retrieved from:
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=67&c=es&l=en
United Nations Development Program. (2011). HDI Indices and Data. Retrieved from:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Table2.pdf

These numbers provide important indicators for how economic growth compares to human
development. Gross Domestic Product as a percentage of real growth rate (GDP % real growth rate)
measures a country’s rate of change in gross domestic product from year to year. We see that not only
have human development measures improved, but the economic growth rates in each of these
countries have steadily improved with the exception of Cambodia and El Salvador in 2009, which was
likely caused by the global economic downturn. Though Cambodia and El Salvador both experienced
economic downturns in 2009, El Salvador’s economy did not suffer as badly. The International
Monetary Fund attributed Cambodia’s downturn to a slowdown in the country’s key economic sectors,
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including the garment and tourism industries, and reduced direct foreign investment (International
Monetary Fund 2008). El Salvador may have fared better due to income entering the country through
remittances from Salvadorans working in the U.S., though remittances were also in decline during the
economic downturn (Ribando Seelke 2010). In Cambodia, the PPP increased and has leveled off around
$2,000 per capita and in El Salvador, PPP has steadily increased. In Mozambique, PPP increased from
2000 to 2005, but dropped after 2005 and has not recovered. Of course, increased economic growth
and development does not always indicate the presence of democratic governance. Mozambique and
Cambodia improved the most in terms of HDI and enjoyed higher economic growth rates than El
Salvador. While these numbers indicate progress in terms of economic growth and human
development, Cambodia and Mozambique have struggled with the transition to democracy, and are
both considered to be in danger of reverting to authoritarianism.
Because of this risk, it is important to revisit the Freedom House scores for El Salvador,
Mozambique and Cambodia. These numbers show three countries whose rankings have remained
stagnant since the early 2000s. Since 2002, Cambodia has been ranked “not free” and on a scale of 1 to
7 (with seven serving as the worst) Cambodia has consistently has earned a 6 for political rights and a 5
for civil liberties. El Salvador has fared much better in the rankings and has maintained a rating of “free”
since 2002 with a 2 for political rights and a 3 for civil liberties, which is a real accomplishment.
Mozambique falls in the middle of Cambodia and El Salvador, earning a “partly free” rating. In recent
years, Mozambique’s civil liberties ranking has improved from a 4 to a 3; however, the 2011 political
rights ranking fell, from 3 to 4 (Freedom House, 2002-2011). The rankings over the last decade show
some movement, but overall Cambodia and Mozambique’s numbers indicate a struggle to improve in
several important areas, while El Salvador’s numbers indicate that although it is a country in which there
is still work to be done, it is successfully transitioning democracy. Though El Salvador’s democracy
would not yet be considered consolidated, Latin American democracies such as El Salvador have
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continued to progress towards consolidation, especially in the last three years (Latinobarómeter 2010).
As noted, democracy building is not an overnight process; however, some could argue that these
numbers show that Cambodia (and Mozambique, to a lesser degree) is only democratic in name and not
in practice. Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 highlight more detailed Freedom House rankings for each of the
countries over time.
Table 5.7 Freedom House Rankings: Cambodia
Year
Freedom Rating

2002
5.5

2005
5.5

2008
5.5

2011
5.5

Civil Liberties

5

5

5

5

Political Rights

6

6

6

6

Table 5.8 Freedom House Rankings: El Salvador
Year
Freedom Rating

2002
2.5

2005
2.5

2008
2.5

2011
2.5

Civil Liberties

3

3

3

3

Political Rights

2

2

2

2

Table 5.9 Freedom House Rankings: Mozambique
Year
Freedom Rating

2002
3.5

2005
3.5

2008
3.0

2011
3.5

Civil Liberties

4

4

3

3

Political Rights

3

3

3

4

Freedom House. (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011). Freedom in the World. Country Reports for Cambodia, El Salvador,
Mozambique. Retrieved from: http://www.freedomhouse.org.
*The survey rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free
and 7 the least free.
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One important concern for Mozambique in the post-conflict period has been a slide into
dominant-party rule by Frelimo. Przeworski notes that one-party control of a large share of the
legislature and lack of change in power at the executive level is bad for the longevity of democracy
(Przeworski 1999). He states, “democracy is more likely to survive when no single force dominates
politics completely and permanently” (Przeworski 1999, 16). The stability of democracy is endangered
when one party holds too much power in the government, meaning one party dominates the legislative
branch, the executive branch and a country’s bureaucratic functions. One party rule is also a concern in
Cambodia whose government has been under the control of the CPP. Most scholars have concerns
about the state of these democracies and the Freedom House numbers show the lack of progression on
important measures of democracy above and beyond elections. It may even be a stretch to categorize
Mozambique and Cambodia as electoral democracies as scholars argue that the holding of elections
does not equal democracy (Friedman 2011). Though both countries lack progression towards
democracy, Mozambique has made more strides than Cambodia.
Despite the challenges parties face in adopting a democratic system, some parties in these
countries are contributing to positive democratic gains. According to Manning, Renamo has continued
to win seats, despite the fact that it hasn’t been victorious in taking the legislative or executive branch
(Manning 2008). Carbone agrees with this assessment, noting the difficulty that insurgent parties have
restructuring from a military organization to a political organization following a conflict and then going
up against a highly organized and institutional incumbent party (Carbone 2005). Renamo exemplifies
this challenge; it has never won a presidential election and has faced declining numbers of
representatives elected to the legislative branch. Manning, who noted Renamo’s electoral success in
2008 later wrote in 2010 that Mozambique was experiencing a slide into one-party rule (Manning 2010).
But this is not so much Frelimo’s fault as Renamo’s, as it has failed to become a competitive political
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party. Frelimo has not prevented other political parties from forming through formal structures,
however, its formidable organization may serve to discourage political competition (Sumich 2010).
In addition to the aforementioned poverty and Remano’s inability to turn itself into a
competitive political party, Mozambique has experienced elections of which most have not been
considered free or fair and its electoral rules have benefited Frelimo (Manning 2008). This calls into
question to whether or not democracy is working in Mozambique. However, Renamo’s ability to
challenge of elections using the appeal process through the National Electoral Commission for
leveraging complaints demonstrates Renamo’s desire to work within the confines of the new system
rather than resorting to violence to make changes. Ultimately, the complaint Renamo filed over the
2004 elections was dismissed due to the party’s inability to meet technical requirements; however, the
ability to use newly established channels to voice complaints and concerns, and Frelimo’s allowing the
existence and functioning of such channels, is an important development and is an example of a
successful aspect of the transition (Manning 2008).
It is more challenging to find positive developments in the Cambodian system based on the
country’s electoral outcomes coupled with the knowledge of CPP operations. Despite the signing of the
peace agreement by the warring parties, in Cambodia and in each of these cases, it is difficult to assess
whether any of the parties had a commitment to adopting a democratic form of government when the
peace agreement was signed. In examining the actions of the CPP and FUNCINPEC in the post-conflict
period, it would seem that any agreement to cooperate with one another in building a democratic
government was superficial (Roberts 2002). Similarly, El Salvador and Mozambique also had and have
deeply polarized populations and political cultures in which political parties were and are not
accustomed to working in conjunction with one another. For example, the CPP and Hun Sen have taken
legal action against dissidents, forced opposition party leaders into exile and further entrenched a
governmental system that runs on patronage and corruption (McCargo 2010). These CPP actions
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haven’t necessarily caused instability in the country (aside from the 1997 violence), but they do not
bode well for the development of democracy in Cambodia.
Stability in a post-conflict period can sometimes be achieved by a transition to democracy, but
at times what looks like a democratic transition may be democratic only in name. According to Sonja
Wolf, El Salvador’s democracy is weak and the country has lapsed into electoral authoritarianism,
meaning that democratic changes were adopted only to end the war and electoral politics have been
used to maintain the status quo of the country’s elites and ARENA political party. It could be argued
that this strategy is present in other transitioning governments, possibly Cambodia and Mozambique, as
well. While Wolf has maintained this characterization of El Salvador even after the FMLN (and Mauricio
Funes’) election to the presidency in 2009, she recognizes the democracy there is progressing. Wolf
contends that there are some democratic elements in El Salvador’s government, but that conceptual
ambiguity muddies the definitions of democracy and authoritarianism. There is an absence of clear
democratic characteristics in its government and El Salvador may actually be entering a new form of
authoritarianism (Wolf 2009).
Assessing democracy using Wolf’s perspective, and in reviewing the research and ideas on
democratic transition, Mozambique and Cambodia could easily be classified as sliding into electoral
authoritarianism as well, perhaps even to a greater degree than El Salvador. Other scholars, such as
Kheang Un would agree and he has studied this specifically in Cambodia. Though the formal conflict
ended with the peace agreements, Cambodia continues to struggle with aspects of authoritarianism
such as lack of rule of law, unchecked corruption, pervasive patronage and executive usurpation of
power. The persistence of former Khmer Rouge elites in positions of power, intolerance of opposition
and absolutism, and lack of accountability for war crimes are some of the main concerns scholars note in
Cambodia’s democracy (Un 2006).
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Additionally, some of the parties themselves are not democratic. Afonso Dhlakama’s position as
leader of Renamo has been maintained by electoral authoritarianism. The lack of victory for Renamo
and Dhlakama’s continued billing of the party as a coalition of the marginalized has allowed him to
maintain his position as leader of this group. He portrays himself as the voice of this coalition (those
who feel they’re not served by Frelimo and the political system), but he does not allow any real changes
in the structure of the party. Though Renamo’s strategy has not been helped it to make gains in
elections, Dhlakama continues to make the majority of decisions and disallow restructuring that could
make the party more competitive electorally. Wolf states that the quality of the electoral process is the
key item differentiating electoral authoritarianism from electoral democracy (Wolf 2009). If this is the
case, then the lack of free and fair elections in Cambodia and Mozambique through the years could
certainly cause them to be viewed as electoral authoritarianism governments. With free and fair
elections and the peaceful transition of power at the executive level in 2009, El Salvador exists as the
country with the least authoritarian characteristics out of the countries in this study based on this
particular measure.
To guard against the risk of electoral authoritarianism, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique
all received foreign aid to assist with the implementation of their peace agreements. The U.S., UN and
other donors have made contributions to economic development dependent on compliance with certain
conditions, such as adopting policies that will encourage economic growth or support peace agreements
(Manning and Malbrough 2010). Attaching conditions to aid can serve to promote democracy by
influencing internal actors to abide by certain rules, but conditionality may come with its own set of
drawbacks. For example, donors may not understand of the local context, there may be issues with
coordination and cooperation among donors and potential misuse of aid by recipients, or donations may
be used to promote external agendas. In other words, there is plenty of potential misuse by recipients
of aid (Manning and Malbrough 2010; Ehrenfeld, Kogut and Hove 2003).
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Manning and Malbrough state that foreign aid has worked to improve Mozambique’s
democracy because of bilateral donors’ understanding of Mozambican history, political culture and past,
coupled with donor coordination and cooperation (Manning and Malbrough 2010). Aid can influence
recipients to work to strengthen democracy, and it can assist with promoting stability. Still,
Mozambique is not very democratic; Sumich argues that it is a state with elected one-party rule (Sumich
2010). The U.S. and UN have both provided large amounts of foreign investment to Mozambique in the
post-conflict period, but it is unlikely that either would call Mozambique a consolidated democracy. The
U.S. and Mozambique have been improving bilateral relations and according to the U.S. government,
power lies in the hands of the citizens of Mozambique and they elect leaders (CIA 2012). Mozambique’s
brief history as a democracy, even with millions in foreign investment and aid conditionality, has not
produced a solid liberal democracy that is moving towards consolidation.
Cambodia has received billions in aid from external actors for development purposes, with half
of its national budget funded by Official Development Assistance (ODA) from countries like Australia and
China (Australian Government Website 2011; Brookings Institution 2008). While aid is important for
rebuilding and investing following a war, there are concerns that too much aid can lead to dependence
on the assistance. Additionally, the aid may not benefit the population at large. In Cambodia, little to
no progress has been made in poverty reduction. According to Ear, “aid does not significantly increase
investment, nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators, but
it does increase the size of government” (Ear 2007, 71). Though Ear expresses doubt about aid’s role in
improving the Cambodian populations’ standard of living, the country’s HDI ranking has shown steady
improvement over the past decade.
Post-conflict El Salvador has also been the recipient of foreign aid, mainly from the U.S. and UN.
The influx and channeling of aid to certain groups, mainly El Salvador’s reformed elites, has caused
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tensions between reformed and traditional elite groups and other potential recipients, such as the
FMLN. 7 While reform has come from aid from organizations such as USAID, Quan states:
USAID collaboration with these reformed elites did facilitate the reform of El Salvador;
opposition to El Salvador’s unchanged patterns of social inequality and economic exploitation,
for example, are no longer punished by torture and death. But social problems such as high
levels of poverty and crime continue unabated as a small, wealthy elite persists (Quan 2005,
288).
Though it may be given with the best of intentions, foreign aid can perpetuate already existing problems
(like inequality) that a receiving country is facing. When aid is used improperly it is the population at
large, and especially the poor, who suffer the most in this scenario. This can negatively impact
democratization and reduce the chance of consolidation, as the still-impoverished citizens develop
distrust in corrupt or inept government.
In sum, the incumbent and insurgent political parties of El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia
have been forced to change from conflict parties to peaceful political parties. This is difficult, but not
impossible. During the wars in these countries, insurgent parties such as FUNCINPEC, Renamo, and the
FMLN were born. In the wars’ aftermath the incumbent parties (ARENA, Frelimo and the CPP) have
continued to be successful in a peacetime political arena through wins in presidential and parliamentary
elections instead of on the battlefield, and by adapting to conduct themselves in the new political
setting. Sometimes the adaptations made by incumbent parties have not always been legal and
legitimate. In some of the cases, such as Cambodia, the incumbent party (the CPP) has used tactics such
as intimidation of political opponents and violence to maintain control. Though FUNCINPEC and
Renamo have had very limited electoral success in the post-conflict period, it is possible for insurgent
parties to win and for incumbent parties to step aside graciously. The FMLN has demonstrated this
claim by winning the presidency and having successful showings in legislative and municipal elections.
7

Reformed elites refers to the group of the Salvadoran dominant class who came to the realization that the military
rule of the 1980s would have to be replaced with a political party that won elections and was acceptable to the U.S.
(Quan 2005). Traditional elites in El Salvador were those who were based in the coffee-growing sector and were
conservative and unwilling to support any type of social or political reform.
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This requires effort by both insurgent and incumbent organizations, as political party adaptations to
democracy in the immediate post-conflict period have important implications for consolidating and
moving forward with democracy.
Not only is it important to assess the way political parties adapt and move forward during a
transition, we must also examine their origins and how that may influence success in the post-conflict
period. The political parties in this study did not emerge from a democratic background and are diverse
ideologically. Political parties like the FMLN, Frelimo and the CPP come from backgrounds in line with
socialist and Marxist theory and fall on the left of the political spectrum. On the other side of the scale,
Renamo and ARENA take a conservative, right wing ideological perspective and similarly, FUNCINPEC
comes from a traditional, royalist background. On the face of it, the parties of the left have been more
successful at winning elections, with Frelimo and the CPP dominating their respective governments and
the FMLN making significant political advances. ARENA has been a successful party on the right, winning
the executive branch in many consecutive election cycles in El Salvador. In past elections, as noted in
Chapter 3, ARENA relied less on ideology and more on fear tactics and images from the war to influence
voters and gain support. Therefore, perhaps the ideology of the party is not such a significant factor
leading to electoral success in the post-conflict period. Rather it may be that a number of other factors
that have been discussed in this study (such as development of political party organization and the
influence of external powers) are more important in influencing a party’s success.
One could argue that as incumbent parties, the left has clung to power with more determination
than the right. In Cambodia and Mozambique the parties on the left (the CPP and Frelimo) have shown
less commitment to democratic principles than right wing incumbent parties like ARENA. Actions taken
by the CPP and Frelimo to reduce the competitiveness of alternative political parties in elections,
silencing dissidents, and altering rules in their favor shows a lack of commitment to democratic
governance. In El Salvador, ARENA surprised many by actually allowing an alternation in power after the
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people of El Salvador spoke through elections. This shows two things: a commitment to democracy on
the part of ARENA and that the FMLN developed enough of a popular following to win elections after
the conflict in El Salvador. Both aspects explain the peaceful alternation in power and the FMLN’s
achievement as an insurgent party, whereas other conservative insurgent parties in this study have been
less successful also because of their own failures.
Yet, of all of the factors that measure whether or not a democracy is or will be successful, public
support for democracy is often identified as one of the most key elements in a democratic transition
(Diamond 1999). In general, support for democracy was measured at 59 percent in El Salvador in the
2010 Latinobarómeter Survey and satisfaction with democracy was measured at 43 percent of those
surveyed (Latinobarómeter 2010). In Mozambique, a 2008 survey conducted by Afrobarometer showed
59 percent of participants found democracy preferable to any other kind of government (Afrobarometer
2008). And in Cambodia, participants in a survey conducted by Matthew Carlson and Mark Turner in
2008 found 97.5 percent of participants answered that support for a democratic system was good or
very good (Carlson and Turner 2008). In this case it could be argued that Cambodians were saying
democracy was what they wanted, but not what they have. These surveys assess support for democracy
versus other systems and do not indicate whether or not respondents believed the Cambodian
government was democratic. This number is surprising given that some scholars, like Larry Diamond,
emphasize the importance of public support in fostering a successful democracy; however, it should be
noted that a high percentage of public support for democracy does not necessarily equal a strong
democracy (Diamond 1999). Overall, the successes and failures of the transitions and political parties
examined in this study have shown that though these cases have many similarities in their transitions
(timeframe, international political climate, internal political climate, the role of external and internal
political actors, the existence of insurgent and incumbent parties, etc.) these similarities do not lead to
parallel outcomes in each case.

90

Successes and Failures in Consolidation
Assessing democratic consolidation and the strength of a country’s democracy is an important part
of discovering what works in promoting consolidation. An evaluation of the current state of democracy
in Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique shows us three countries with political parties that used to
function as warring groups that, in the post-conflict period, have changed the way they conduct
business. Incumbent or insurgent, the parties, even operating in a political process that is less than
democratic, are no longer overtly militant and none of the opposition parties advocate the violent
overthrow of government. Although the three countries have made improvements in areas such as
respect for human rights, the alternation of power after free and fair elections (in El Salvador), and
increases in public support of democracy, these countries would not be considered consolidated
democracies by standard definitions. It would go too far to say that in these countries democracy has
become habit, that there is no turning back, or that the population believes that there is no alternative
to democracy. Though this is an accepted definition of consolidation, Steven Friedman questions its
simplicity. He asks, how we are supposed to know when populations recognize democracy as the only
option? And further, who is supposed to recognize that there is no alternative, the masses or elites?
(Friedman 2011). Friedman’s work highlights the complexity in defining a consolidated democracy and
presents valid questions as to how such a complicated idea can be measured. Due to the existence of
historical elite who dominated in each of these countries (“the 14 Families” in El Salvador; colonizers
and Frelimo in Mozambique; and the traditional monarchs, colonizers and Khmer elites in Cambodia)
the people in each of these countries would likely answer that there can be no democracy until there is
elite recognition that there is no alternative to democracy.
Though some scholars question how we measure consolidation, others focus on how to determine
whether it exists. Some analysts, but not all, identify these factors in assessing whether or not a
democracy is consolidated:
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Alternation in power between former rivals; continued stability in times of economic hardship;…
stability in the face of a ‘radical restructuring of the party system’; and the absence of politically
significant anti-system parties or movements (Friedman 2011).
All of these factors are present in this study of Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. Each of these
countries began transitions to democracy in the early 1990s and, as all developing democracies
elsewhere in previous eras, have faced challenges in developing the new system. Most scholars seem to
praise specific achievements in the move towards democracy, such as signing a peace agreement or
allowing the formation of political parties and political competition (de Zeeuw 2006). However, many
scholars, like Friedman, caution against calling transitions successful too soon (Friedman 2011).
Because consolidation and the entrenchment of democracy is no easy feat, the concern that
naturally emerges is that countries may backslide into authoritarianism or become failed states. Though
El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia have all adopted some form of democracy following their
conflicts, each of these countries risks backsliding into dictatorship and war. El Salvador’s violence,
gangs and drug crime lead some scholars to believe it is at risk to become a failed state, as political
networks and criminal networks intermingle, creating a powerful arrangement that could be difficult to
dismantle (Richani 2010). In Mozambique and Cambodia, the slide into one-party domination puts
these states at risk to adopt authoritarian forms of government and some sources, such as Freedom
House, contend that Cambodia is already there (Manning 2010; McCargo 2010). Though there is no
litmus test for democracy, assessing individual successes and failures establishes a way to evaluate a
country’s overall transition. Examining how political parties behave in newly introduced forms of
government can help us predict the likelihood of consolidation.
Impact of this Study and What it Means Going Forward
Ideas about how to promote democratic forms of government have long been debated in
international politics. We can see the progression of democracy over time by more closely examining
the waves of democracy, studying long standing democracies and examining emerging democracies
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following a conflict period. This research allows scholars to generate new perspectives and begin to
isolate which factors are important and less important in sustaining an emerging democracy. Examining
how political parties transition and what makes them successful as political competitors is a significant
piece of the transition period and can provide insight for how external actors can support such parties in
the future. Distinguishing successful from unsuccessful transitions, and determining what explains their
relative success, is especially essential as outsiders react to the democratic transitions presently
occurring. Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique may provide important clues for understanding and
predicting the trajectory of newly transitioning democracies, such as those associated with the Arab
Spring. Going forward, this research could identify ways in which countries may transition in the context
of the global war on terror. In this study, democratic transition was postponed until the end of the Cold
War. The global war on terror could have a similar effect on today’s non-transitioned countries.
Ultimately, though political context and time period are important, internal actors remain the most
important players in the transition according to this research.
There are a number of conclusions one can draw about democratic transition and the political
parties that act as the primary internal players in the post conflict period. Here are the findings of this
research:








Political parties, both incumbent and insurgent, will adapt in the post-conflict period. These
adaptations may amount to legitimate or illegitimate means to maintain control, but ultimately
parties are more likely adapt to function in the new political situation to win elections than to
return to war or resort to violence.
Democratic transition is not easy and is largely dependent on each individual country’s political
context, as well as their political parties. Countries will face a number of threats to democratic
transition.
If one party dominates control of the political system, there is a heightened risk of backsliding
into one-party rule or electoral authoritarianism. In the interest of ending a conflict, some
parties may agree to peace agreements, but incumbent parties seek to use weaknesses in the
emerging system to maintain political control.
External intervention is not a magic bullet. Though it can halt the war initially, an imposed
peace that does not reflect an understanding of the conflict and the failure to address deepseated issues will only delay a return to conflict, which will be played out in one way or another.
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Despite the similarities in their transitions (from a period of war to a period of peace, the timing of
the transition at the end of the Cold War, the external influences, the existence of insurgent parties and
incumbent parties, and similar ideological divides within each country) Cambodia, El Salvador and
Mozambique have produced governments that can be described with widely varying degrees of success.
El Salvador is the only country in this study that is clearly currently transitioning to democracy. El
Salvador’s alternation in power is a concrete achievement that sets the country’s democratic transition
apart from Cambodia and Mozambique. One conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the
political parties must be willing to work together to make a democratic transition successful. Factors
such as external guidance can be of benefit to political parties during the transition, but ultimately, the
change in the parties’ structures, attitudes and willingness to alter the way they govern must be
achieved internally.

Taking a nuanced approach to understanding both structural and attitudinal

changes during the transition period is a significant finding of this study. Democratic transition is
difficult and even with good intentions and a sound plan for transition, challenges arise and incumbent
political parties are likely to adjust in ways that allow them to maintain power, sometimes through
undemocratic means. What is clear from this comparison of three cases is that each transition is
different and we must exercise caution in deeming a democratic transition as successful too early in the
process, or assuming that political parties will behave democratically following a peace agreement.
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